REVIEW OF NEIGHBORHOOD-BASED

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

IN DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES

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September 29, 2016

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Executive Summary

Polis Solutions is pleased to submit this final report to detail our findings from the Review of Neighborhood-Based Leadership Development Efforts project, which we have completed under BJA Contract Number 20160708-122632-85. We intend for the report to provide BJA and other audiences with a quick but comprehensive overview of programs aimed at building neighborhood-based leadership capacity in distressed communities. The report comprises an introduction and five sections, key points from each of which are summarized below.

The report begins with an introductory section that provides readers with a background discussion of the challenge of leadership development in distressed communities. Section 1.0 presents an overview of key literature that analyzes the major root causes of distressed communities. Section 2.0 presents an overview of key literature that discusses current approaches to analyzing the leadership gap in distressed communities. The longest part of the report is Section 3.0, which contains descriptive overviews of representative leadership development programs that we have divided into eight different categories. In Section 4.0, we turn our attention to key gaps in current programs, as well as in the evaluation of their effects and outcomes. We conclude the report with Section 5.0, which offers a concise list of recommendations that we see as essential to charting a viable way forward on creating, fielding, and evaluating effective leadership development programs for distressed communities that so urgently need them.

Given the brevity of the project and project timeline, we want to be forthright in cautioning that this report should not be seen as an exhaustive inventory of every relevant leadership development effort in the United States, let alone of foreign efforts of note.

Nonetheless, we are confident that the cross-section of programs we have included here will give readers a sufficient critical awareness of the field to make informed decisions about what exists and what does not, and about what works and what does not. In the interest of time and efficiency, we have avoided presenting duplicative programs, and have focused instead on finding noteworthy representative efforts from each of the following eight categories:

- Neighborhood Leadership Programs & Similar Efforts

- Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR) Programs

- Grassroots Leadership Programs & Related Efforts

- Remote Delivery & Self-Directed Programs

- Programs that Leverage Marginalized Community Members & Leaders

- Youth Leadership Development Programs

- Overseas Leadership Development Programs

- Other Programs of Note

We have tried to give particular attention to programs that have undergone at least some measure of formal evaluation, however limited. With that said, we hasten to add that evaluations vary widely in methodological rigor and detail, and describe below in Section 4.0 some of the limitations of the evaluations typically conducted in the evaluation of leadership development programs.

The following executive summary highlights key points from each section of the full report:

Introduction – The Challenge of Leadership Development in Distressed Neighborhoods

1. Common thread of effective leadership in two different arenas: community activism and counterinsurgency.
2. Weak leadership in distressed communities has hampered community policing efforts for several decades. The cycle must be reversed if real change is to occur in building community-policing trust.
3. Effective leadership development and community engagement will require some degree of prudent risk with respect to building relationships with non-traditional leaders.
4. Framing weak leadership and leadership gaps as a question of civic capacity.
5. Civic capacity = the ability to collaboratively co-create positive social conditions in a manner that respects diversity and difference while enhancing community trust and safety.
6. Civic capacity does not require consensus or agreement, but it does require finding common ground on "wicked problems" and collaborating effectively to address them.
7. Civic capacity requires strong community leadership.
8. The "Catch-22" of civic capacity: it is weakest in the very communities that most urgently need local leadership.
9. Engagement-Based Policing vs. "Community Policing 1.0" – the imperative of engaging marginalized community members and non-traditional leaders and stakeholders.
10. A prospective thought: a marriage of focused deterrence, procedural justice, and leadership development?

Section 1.0 – Key Causes of Distressed Communities

1. Guiding premise: causes of distress such as poverty, isolation from anchor institutions, legacies of discrimination, and weak schools create a diminished capacity for civic capacity, which in turn perpetuates distress.
2. Sources of distress can weaken and even undermine efforts at leadership development.
3. DCI "average" distressed ZIP code: at least 25% of adults lack a high school diploma, and 25% of adults live at or below the federal poverty level. Over half of adults in these communities are unemployed, and median household income is only 68% of the state's median income.
4. William Julius Wilson: steep reduction of stable employment in distressed communities caused by a globalizing economy and shrinking manufacturing sector, and how this economic restructuring disproportionately impacted poor black families and their neighborhoods.
5. Wellbeing of Adolescents in Vulnerable Environments (WAVE): troubling correlations between geography and a range of mental and non-communicable medical conditions. (Baltimore longevity stats)
6. Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University (2015:35): "The extent of persistent housing market distress makes it clear that public efforts to remediate the effects of the housing crash must continue…majority-minority communities

make up half of the neighborhoods where house prices and home equity remain furthest behind."

7. Kahne and Middaugh (2008): students' race and academic track (college-bound vs. non-college bound) and schools' socioeconomic status determine the availability of programs that build and encourage civic engagement.

Section 2.0 – Current Approaches to Understanding Leadership Gaps

1. The quandary central to the challenge of addressing the leadership gap: distressed neighborhoods that most urgently need strong collaborative relationships with the criminal justice system have the hardest time building them.
2. Community Development Corporations (CDCs) and community-based development organizations: legacies from the Civil Rights and anti-poverty movements of the 1950s and 1960s. and has achieved some notable successes at reversing urban blight and revitalizing distressed neighborhoods in both urban and rural areas (Anglin and Herts, 2004).
3. A delicate balance: deploying requisite outside technical expertise and resources necessary to address the complex challenges of urban redevelopment, while simultaneously recognizing the political and ethical imperative for empowering distressed communities to take the lead in their own revitalization.
4. "Put the community back in community development" (Sviridoff and Ryan 1996).
5. But consider Anglin and Herts (2004): "efforts at deeper neighborhood participation showed no particular benefit to community residents, regardless of the level of their involvement, if the residents do not possess the skills and experience to guide the community development process."
6. Chicago PD and BJA INOP challenges with community leadership gap.
7. The leadership gap also relates more generally to the challenge of weak *collective efficacy* in distressed neighborhoods: combined effect of social cohesion among neighbors and their willingness to intervene by taking positive actions for the greater good.
8. Foster-Fishman, *et al*. (2007): challenges of neighborhood mobilization and resident participation in the implementation of community-building initiatives (CBIs).
9. Community involvement and leadership skills are negatively correlated with a belief that violence is an effective way to solve disputes, thus programs that engender such pro-social skills reduce violent behavior. But contrast Waasdorp, *et al*. (2014): aggression, both relational and overt, is positively associated with perceptions of leadership and higher social status in distressed neighborhoods.
10. Another tough balancing act: the enduring tension between programs sponsored by government agencies as opposed to those run by activist organizations.

Section 3.0 – Overview of Solutions, Programs, and Responses

1. Our literature review and research identified a substantial and troubling gap in leadership development programs specifically related to community safety and crime prevention in distressed neighborhoods.
2. The majority of existing leadership development programs that we found tend to cluster around wider issues of community development, urban revitalization,

public health, education, housing, and other issues where tensions and mistrust between marginalized communities and government agencies is relatively less acute than it tends to be around crime and criminal justice.

3. While many of the strategies in nearly all of the leadership development programs we identified are transferable to the community safety arena, the challenge of building trust in distressed neighborhoods is a formidable issue the intractability of which is difficult to overstate

4. Organizing, empowering, and services provision (Dreier, 1996). In seeking to develop community leadership capacity, it is thus important to ask up front: *what kind of leadership, and leadership to do what*?

5. Smock's (2000) five community organization leadership models: power-based model, feminist model, transformative model, civic model, and community-building model.

6. Neighborhood Leadership Programs (NLPs),

7. Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR)

8. Planning Academies and SafeGrowth™

9. Self-directed and web-based leadership courses

10. Grassroots and culturally-based program models

11. Programs that leverage marginalized community members & leaders

12. Youth Leadership Development

13. Overseas Leadership Development Programs

14. Other Programs of Note – Polis pilot (Fayetteville), Clemente Course, and barbershop initiatives.

Section 4.0 – Key Gaps

1. There is a significant gap in programs that are sufficiently long, detailed, and sustainable to make a lasting impact where it is needed most.

2. There is a significant gap in rigorous evaluation data, and by extension a gap in evidence-based programs. Plainly stated, many of the evaluation protocols have not been undertaken with sufficient depth and rigor to warrant large-scale investment in most of the programs we have considered here.

3. There is a significant gap in programs specific to community safety and crime prevention. Most of the programs we identified were created in sectors other than public safety.

4. This relates to the fourth and most significant gap: there is a monumental gap in trust-building efforts to improve the legitimacy of the police and other CJS organizations in the eyes, hearts, and minds of the residents of distressed neighborhoods.

Section 5.0 – Conclusion and Recommendations

      5.1 – Engage both traditional and non-traditional stakeholders and leaders.

      5.2 – Be proactive in answering neighborhoods' legitimate self-interest and desire for equal partnerships.

      5.3 – Address issues of safety and security related to community participation.

      5.4 – Develop leadership programs specifically aimed at channeling demonstrated skills of people with historical direct and indirect ties to gun violence and other illegal networks.

      5.5 – Engage existing pools of potential community leaders such as military veterans.

      5.6 – Explore possibilities for leveraging AmericaCorps-VISTA, BJA VIPS, and other similar programs to create sustainable leadership development platforms.

      5.7 – Programs must truly develop leadership, not merely teach community members about police work.

      5.8 – Develop sustainable, evidence-based, focused, mid/long-range efforts in high-impact communities rather than diffuse, "one and done" trainings.

      5.9 – Explore avenues for integrating focused deterrence, leadership development, and procedural justice in initiatives in distressed neighborhoods.

Introduction:
The Challenge of Leadership Development in Distressed Neighborhoods

We begin with a seemingly improbable and doubtless politically risky juxtaposition: community policing and counterinsurgency. At first blush, most people would argue that domestic community policing efforts have little in common with efforts overseas to defeat violent insurgencies or terrorist and extremist organizations. But in fact, for fundamentally similar reasons, analysts and policy makers in both arenas have long identified the same essential requirement for bringing about peace, stability, and democratic social order: effective, legitimate local leadership and substantive, reciprocal government engagement with those leaders (see Kilcullen, 2008). Where such leadership and engagement are present, the possibility for meaningful progress is greatly increased. And where it is lacking, the likelihood of continued crisis and failure is drastically higher.

The United States learned painfully in Afghanistan and Iraq that combat and security operations alone will never bring about peace and stability where legitimate local leadership does not exist. As Kilcullen (2008:3) argues in his strategic analysis of counterinsurgency, "'control' does not mean imposing order through unquestioned dominance, so much as achieving collaboration towards a shared set of objectives." Likewise, the criminal justice system has learned in recent years that no level of arrests and incarceration will bring peace and stability to distressed neighborhoods that lack effective leadership. In both cases, the political challenge of fostering legitimate ground-level leadership cannot be ignored, nor can it be adequately addressed other than through procedurally just and democratic means.

Dreier (1996:126) argued during the first era of community policing in the 1990s that successful police reform efforts require "winning hearts and minds," and not just

limited tangible measures such as increased police staffing or infrastructure improvements. But despite early admonitions such as Dreier's, community policing and related criminal justice reform efforts have been perennially hampered by an insufficient degree and quality of community engagement in distressed neighborhoods. Echoing Dreier's sentiments a generation later, the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing has provided a renewed call for attention to the critical nexus between the absence of effective community engagement and weak neighborhood leadership.

If the federal government is going to increase the likelihood of success for crucial criminal justice reforms, this leadership gap must be addressed in a significant and sustained manner. Bluntly put, this will require resources and commitments substantially greater than what has previously been invested in community leadership development. And it will require some prudent risk in terms of engaging non-traditional neighborhood stakeholders whose historical mistrust and even outright hostility toward the criminal justice system is high, and in many cases all too justified by a legacy of cruel and discriminatory actions.

Needless to say, this kind of engagement will not come easily, nor can it be expected to progress quickly or smoothly. However, it is the only realistic path forward. Popular opinion driven by sensational media accounts and rhetorical over-simplification fosters the illusion that social reform and progress occur like a "bolt out of the blue." But the deeper and more complex reality is that all lasting change is driven and sustained by effective leadership. To use Dreier's (1996:128) evocative and poignant example:

> Many Americans believe, for example, that the 1955 Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott and the subsequent civil rights movement were triggered spontaneously by Rosa Parks' sudden refusal to move to the back of the bus. In fact, Mrs. Parks

and her husband were longtime civil rights activists involved with the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and other organizations. She had attended the Highlander Folk School, a training center for citizenship education, and was part of a network of African-American community leaders that included E.D. Nixon of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters. This network had the capacity to mobilize resources quickly and efficiently. It arranged meeting sites (particularly in churches), had access to mimeograph machines and telephone lists, raised funds, organized a complex alternative transportation system, and identified candidates for a variety of leadership roles, including Dr. Martin Luther King and a number of less heralded individuals (Morris, 1984; Jarratt, 1975; Branch, 1988).

The deeper reality that Dreier describes here is a crucial reminder that without an infrastructure of practically, politically, and ethically strong leadership, aspirations of positive change cannot be realized.

The *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21ˢᵗ Century Policing* urges collaborative, community-based efforts to build relationships, especially in distressed neighborhoods and with vulnerable youth and young adult populations (see Task Force Recommendations 2.1, 4.1. 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7). Expanding on the recommendations in its Final Report, the Task Force's Implementation Guide describes specific steps that communities can take to foster reform, and makes the vital point that "community policing is not just about the behavior and tactics of police; it is also about the civic engagement and *capacity of communities to improve their own neighborhoods*, their quality of life, and their sense of safety and well-being" (Implementation Guide, 2015:13, emphasis added).

However, there is a critical gap between the kinds of steps toward greater community collaboration recommended in the Task Force Implementation Guide and the capacity of some of the nation's most distressed neighborhoods to effectively take them. What is urgently missing from the current blueprint for improving police-community

trust and criminal justice reform are evidence-based, sustainable measures for community capacity building and leadership development. Such measures could help empower residents of the nation's most challenged and marginalized neighborhoods to take a more influential, decisive role in voicing and advancing their own interests.

Effective neighborhood-based leadership is arguably even more important in distressed communities than it is in stable, affluent ones. This is because residents of distressed communities tend to rely much more heavily on neighborhood-level formal and informal support institutions, programs, and networks than do more affluent individuals, who have far greater personal, social, and financial resources to meet their basic needs (see Chaskin, *et al*. 2001:10). For example, thousands of school children in Chicago, Los Angeles, and other U.S. cities depend on volunteer-based community programs such as **Safe Passage** to ensure their ability to walk to and from school in distressed neighborhoods with high levels of crime and gang activity.

If qualified volunteers cannot be recruited, trained, fielded, and directed by effective leaders, the implications can be dire. Safe Passage in several communities, most notably Chicago, relies heavily on military veterans from distressed neighborhoods, whose discipline, motivation, and sense of duty perfectly suits them for the mission of ensuring school children's safety and building positive rapport with them day after day.[1] In return for their volunteer service, veterans are given assistance in resolving their own

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[1] For details on veterans' role in Safe Passage in Chicago, see: www.leaveno**veteran**behind.org/**safe-passage,** www.npr.org/2011/03/24/.../**chicagos-**silent-watchmen-guard-school-route, and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xTGdFp02dbU

struggles, which typically center on debt relief, job placement, and affordable housing.

Safe Passage exemplifies the kind of effort that has wider potential for tapping into

largely unseen and under-used pools of leadership. Conversely, where there is no

effective grass roots leadership in the first place to marshal resources around an issue

such as children's safety going to and from school, programs like Safe Passage are less

likely even to arise at all.

As the example of Safe Passage illustrates, residents' ability to ensure the basic

security and stability of their neighborhoods requires the coordinated, systematic

integration of ground-level situational awareness, available essential resources, and

collaborative action. In a word, creating and sustaining this kind of integration requires

leadership. With this in mind, the present report is based on the well-established concept

of *civic capacity*, which we think helps to explain why ground-level neighborhood

leadership is strong and healthy in some communities and much less so in others. Indeed,

we think that BJA's objective of identifying best practices and unfulfilled needs and gaps

in neighborhood-based leadership development efforts can be usefully framed as a

question of civic capacity.

Drawing on the work of Briggs (2008), Chaskin (2001 and 1999), Saegert (2006

and 2004), Stone (2001), and others, we define civic capacity as ***the ability to***

collaboratively co-create positive social conditions in a manner that respects diversity

and difference while enhancing community trust and safety. According to Saegert

(2004:5), civic capacity includes the following elements:

- Ability to engage with the public domain.
- Ability to influence the social agenda.
- Ability to access public and private sector resources.
- Ability to influence the physical and social environment.

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In turn, these abilities are grounded in knowledge, skills, actions, relationships, and resources (Auspos, *et al*. 2008:1).

Another essential element of civic capacity is the specific ability of diverse, diverging, or conflicting groups and interests to orient productively around a shared public concern. As Auspos, *et al*. (2008:2) describe it, "[c]ivic capacity is thus manifested in interactions between nongovernment and government actors, and in such activities as collective problem-solving, developing agendas for action or reform, building supportive coalitions, and mobilizing resources to create change." With respect to the immediate context of this report, it is vital to note that civic capacity does *not* require agreement or consensus around a given issue, but it *does* require "effective engagement" and "the ability to participate in public life with the result of more democratic governance at various scales" (Saegert, 2004:4). For example, a working group of diverse criminal justice and community stakeholders need not agree about the particular nature of a controversial issue such as youth violence, but must be able to transcend differences in order to find common ground and work collaboratively on implementing promising programs and solutions.

Understood in this way, civic capacity represents a key means of productively addressing social conflicts, issues, and especially what Page (2016:441) calls "wicked problems" that "lack a definitive formulation and have multiple, intertwined causes and manifestations." Following this logic, the inability to productively address "wicked" social issues and problems can lead to turmoil, chaos, and even violence. As Oliver (2000:18) argues:

> Democracies with low civic capacity have fewer resources to solve social
> problems and are more likely to be subject to greater tensions, through riots,

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corruption, or civil disorder. Democracies with greater civic capacity will not only be more responsive to social problems but will have more citizens offering extra-institutional solutions, thus providing greater social stability.

Civic capacity thus depends on shared understandings and joint commitments (Page, 2016) even where there is no clear consensus around an issue.

In its robust form, civic capacity is a core dimension of participatory democracy in which community members function as active partners with government agencies and other organizations, rather than as a passive body on whom policies and laws are enacted. However, such active partnership requires effective leadership; and where such leadership is absent, civic capacity is fundamentally weakened. This presents difficult challenges for government agencies and institutions that are seeking to improve ground-level conditions, as is the case with federal, state and local efforts at revitalizing distressed neighborhoods.

The relationship between leadership development and civic capacity reveals a "Catch-22" of sorts: while strong civic capacity relies on effective neighborhood leadership, such leadership is more likely to emerge in the first place where social, economic, cultural, and other key conditions are much more favorable than they tend to be in distressed communities. Accordingly, a challenge central to leadership development in distressed communities is to leverage unrealized and under-utilized neighborhood leadership talent, social networks, skills, and experience in order to provide catalytic local effects. While such a course of action obviously cannot transform chronically adverse neighborhood conditions overnight, it is almost sure to contribute to the kinds of wider synergies needed for effective reform and long-term change.

How, then, can BJA help foster and support this process? Building on the concept

of civic capacity, criminal justice organizations at all levels from local to federal must work first to identify shared understandings with a diverse spectrum of community leaders, and then develop joint commitments that engage these understandings in meaningful, substantive, and sustainable ways (see Page, 2016). Following the recommendations of the *Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21*[st] *Century Policing*, it is especially important to undertake such efforts with vulnerable and historically marginalized youth and young adult populations. Among other things, and we mentioned above, this means taking decidedly controversial steps to engage non-traditional stakeholders who are deeply mistrustful of the criminal justice system, and whom many in the criminal justice system view with reciprocal mistrust and disdain.

Rhetorical and political admonitions aside, such steps have been conspicuously absent from prior criminal justice initiatives. Earlier forms of community policing and criminal justice reform in the 1990s and 2000s focused almost exclusively on collaborative problem solving and cooperative public safety efforts in partnership with "safe" and "reputable" stakeholders such as school officials, faith leaders, business and property owners, neighborhood watch groups, established community organizations such as the YMCA and Boys and Girls Club, and so forth (see Cordner, 2014; Lyons, 2002; and Rosenbaum and Schuck, 2012). But events since Ferguson have brought national attention to the urgent need for what we call "Engagement-Based Policing" – a new, more politically ambitious paradigm of community policing that takes the bold, strategic step of engaging with marginalized and dispossessed community members whose voices and interests have thus far gone largely unnoticed (Wender and Lande, 2015).

A key element of the Engagement-Based Policing paradigm is tangible support

for leadership development efforts in distressed neighborhoods to fill a void created by legacies of systemic inequality, discrimination, marginalization, and dysfunction. Engagement-Based Policing does not minimize or question the need to engage with more traditional stakeholders, but it does maintain that effective policing must take a more inclusive and collaborative approach to the community than has typically been the case in earlier versions of community policing. For example, many police departments have longstanding collaborative problem-solving programs to help landlords and property owners address and abate conditions related to crime and disorder. But far fewer departments have taken effective steps to work directly with marginalized and impoverished tenants, residents, and homeless people in order to ensure that their interests are met.

Even less has been done to work directly in non-punitive, prosocial ways with the networks of disaffected, often gang-involved young men who are the disproportionate victims and perpetrators of urban gun violence (see Papachristos, *et al*. 2012). Significant from the standpoint of neighborhood leadership is that fact the members of these networks and gangs typically have a much stronger (if often violently and pathologically manifested) sense of neighborhood identity and pride than the average resident (Papachristos, *et al*. 2013). The neighborhood and the gang's coinciding geographic territory are a source of deep symbolic significance held in reverence. As Papachristos, *et al*. explain, "the neighborhood, or more precisely, gang turf, has a nontrivial and multidimensional value for a gang" (2013:419). It an empirical question yet to be answered; but we wonder aloud here about avenues for mitigating gang violence that might find ways to channel "pride of place" in positive directions.

Doing so will require (among other things) an abiding commitment to procedural justice practices. As Papachristos, *et al*. helpfully observe, the offenders in their study in Chicago had a generally positive view of the legitimacy of the law, though simultaneously held an overwhelmingly negative view of the police (2012:436). Taking this a step further, we see particular promise in efforts that would marry focused deterrence programs, the evidence for which is encouraging, with two additional elements: first, a procedural justice paradigm of policing that substantively acts to mitigate street-level mistrust, and second, programs of leadership empowerment that buttress the proactive, non-enforcement aspects of focused deterrence (see, for example, Brunson 2015 and Tyler and Fagan, 2008).

As we noted earlier, there is doubtless risk inherent to such an approach, which inevitably requires greater collaboration between criminal justice and non-traditional community stakeholders such as ex-gang members and formerly incarcerated neighborhood residents who have credibility and legitimacy with the at-risk youth and young adults that the police and mainstream community leaders do not. Even so, the current political climate makes it clear that absent a better working relationship between distressed communities and the criminal justice system, patterns of recurring violence and counterproductive mistrust are the inevitable future (Griffiths and Christian, 2015).

Section 1.0 – Key Causes of Distressed Communities

In order to fully and accurately address the specific issue of leadership gaps in distressed communities, it is necessary to begin by considering the root causes of distressed communities themselves. The BJA's FY16 Byrne Grant solicitation (p. 4) offers the following definition:

> A distressed community or neighborhood is one with hot spots of high crime (overall or types of crime) combined with other key features that may affect a community's capacity to deter crime including concentrated poverty, high unemployment, high levels of residents under criminal supervision, low performing schools, and limited infrastructure such as housing, social services, and business.

Applying the civic capacity framework described above in the introduction, our guiding hypothesis is that there is a significant correlation between these root causes as the BJA and others describe them and neighborhood leadership gaps. Causes of distress such as poverty, isolation from anchor institutions, legacies of discrimination, and weak schools combine in ways that exponentially diminish civic capacity, which in turn perpetuates adverse conditions.

For example, in a study of high school civic learning opportunities, Kahne and Middaugh (2008) showed that students' race and academic track (college-bound vs. non-college bound) and schools' socioeconomic status determine the availability of programs that build and encourage civic engagement. Kahne and Middaugh conclude that "schools appear to be exacerbating inequality by not providing equal civic preparation to students in most need of civic skills and resources" (2008:5). Similarly, Kupchik and Catlaw (2015) show that low performing urban schools with high suspension rates and other punitive security measures turn out students whose civic capacity is diminished (also see Swanstrom, *et al*. 2013).

In highlighting the fundamental nexus between leadership gaps and wider conditions of neighborhood distress, we harbor no illusions that it is within the scope and capacity of the criminal justice system to address most of them. At the same time, the more criminal justice practitioners can contribute to leadership development in the specific context of public safety, the greater the wider positive effects are likely to be for community development and reform efforts. More immediately, we want to call attention to the crucial importance of understanding how the causes and features of community distress have numerous complex practical implications for the design, implementation, and success of leadership development programs in marginalized neighborhoods.

Programmatic considerations that would be largely irrelevant in more stable, affluent, low-crime communities can potentially undermine leadership development efforts in distressed neighborhoods. For example, Bieler, *et al*. (2016) note in an Urban Institute report on reducing gun violence that ensuring sufficient community participation in programs may require providing adequate monetary compensation. They further observe that traditional community meetings and forums disproportionately attract those resident with the resources, civic interest, and wherewithal to participate, but do not engage marginalized yet influential people who could be reached via door-to-door communication or other forms of outreach. Indeed, the people who effectively remain "out of sight and out of mind" under more traditional engagement efforts are often the very ones who are best-positioned to assert their role as informal community leaders in furtherance of prosocial efforts. Our overview below of the causes of distress raises the following sorts of practical questions directly related to leadership program implementation:

- Programs must satisfactorily address community fears that participants are being recruited as "snitches," or are being "set up" for future surveillance, arrest, or other punitive measures.
- Programs must provide basic resources (e.g. meals or meal vouchers, transit fares, childcare, translator/interpreter services, etc.) in order to attract and keep participants.
- Programs must be create credible opportunities for non-traditional stakeholders such as ex-offenders, ex-gang members, at-risk youth, homeless people, undocumented residents, etc.
- Programs must effectively ensure the immediate and longer-term security of participants and their families.
- Programs must win over skeptical criminal justice stakeholders (especially line-level police officers and supervisors) and address concerns such as the potential infiltration into leadership programs of people with active present and future criminal intentions.

Every individual program need not address each of these or other related issues; however, it is important to acknowledge up front that there is a high hurdle to clear in gaining credibility among people whose legitimate lack of trust, faith, and confidence in government (and especially the criminal justice system) is grounded in decades of insufficient, ill-conceived, and often failed efforts at support and assistance.

To paint a more detailed picture of distressed communities, we begin with the 2016 Distressed Communities Index (DCI) developed by the Economic Innovation Group, a DC-based advocacy and policy organization (EIG, 2016). The DCI uses United States census data to identify distressed communities at the ZIP code level. Through a statistical analysis of fundamental economic and demographic variables, including measures of educational attainment and unemployment, the DCI scores ZIP codes with a population of 500 or more on a distress scale of 0-100. For DCI's purposes, "community" is held to be synonymous with ZIP code. A score of 80 or above is considered "distressed" community, indicating that at least "one-quarter of adults have no high school degree and 55 percent of adults are not working" (EIG 2016:9).

The DCI offers a profile of the "average" distressed ZIP code, which is illustrative of the wider causal factors of community distress. According to the DCI, the average distressed ZIP code has a population of whom at least 25% of adults lack a high school diploma, and 25% of adults live at or below the federal poverty level. Over half of adults in these communities are unemployed, and median household income is only 68% of the state's median income. Moreover, these communities have experienced significant instability, seeing "employment decline by 6.7 percent and the number of businesses shrink by 8.3 percent" in the last 5 years (EIG 2016:10). In contrast, the "median community" has seen a modest 2% increase in employment and no loss of business while "prospering" communities have "enjoyed 17.4 percent job growth and saw the number of business establishments in their neighborhoods rise by 8.8 percent" (11). The DCI makes no causal claims; however it is clear that factors such high rates joblessness, lack of educational attainment, and an absence of business investment are crucial indicators of distress. These factors, if not explaining community distress itself, help to explain the *impoverishment of civic capacity* within distressed communities.

In the context of more deeply reaching social science investigations, the DCI can be interpreted as suggesting a distinction between "proximate" and "underlying" causes of community distress. For example, lack of educational attainment is an immediate proximate cause of community distress, while the underlying cause of lack of educational attainment may be various manifestations of racial bias and/or broader economic changes associated with globalization, which have produced chronic structural inequalities.

On this note, it is useful to consider William Julius Wilson's landmark analysis of inner city poverty in America (1987). Wilson focuses on the steep reduction of stable

employment in distressed communities caused by a globalizing economy and shrinking manufacturing sector, and how this economic restructuring disproportionately impacted poor black families and their neighborhoods. As long-term joblessness became the norm, argues Wilson, so did single parent households, because the economic incentive to marry evaporated along with the manufacturing jobs. Households headed by single mothers were further economically disadvantaged, compounding the effect of job losses. Some welfare dependence ensued, because the primary victims of this poverty cycle were children. When the children of these households entered adulthood they found few jobs options and some entered the informal economy of the illegal drug market.

Meanwhile, gains made by the Civil Rights movement differentially benefitted middle-class blacks, allowing them to utilize their relative economic advantage to effect a mass-exodus from distressed areas. This drained leadership talent, role models, and socioeconomic and political capital out of inner-city neighborhoods, leading to civil paralysis and a diminution of civic capacity. Thus, Wilson concludes that "the major cause of the deteriorating economic plight of. . .poor Blacks is inextricably connected with the structure and functioning of the modern American economy" (1987:134).

A number of analyses subsequent to Wilson's called closer attention to the role of race in economic and social marginalization of inner cities. Bennett (1989) agrees with Wilson that economic change was a primary factor in the increasing poverty of blacks, but argues that Wilson overlooked "the existence of a dual labor market [which] reinforces racial discrimination in the labor force" (204). Likewise, Massey and Denton argued in their book, *American Apartheid* (1993) that few of the economic changes Wilson identifies would have been as impactful had it not been for the entrenched legacy

of housing segregation and related discriminatory lending and credit practices that worked to concentrate the cast-offs of globalization into non-white, poor neighborhoods (8). More recently, Dawson and Francis (2016) offer a useful historical overview of what they call "racialized" economic inequality and the perfect storm of intersecting dynamics of race and class discrimination that have shaped the face of urban poverty in American inner cities as well as in poor towns and inner-ring suburbs exemplified by places such as Ferguson, Missouri.

Whether these distressed neighborhoods are located in urban or suburban areas, they share a common set of woes and crises. They are beset by health problems, which begin early in life, a trend discussed in the Wellbeing of Adolescents in Vulnerable Environments (WAVE) study, which identified troubling correlations between geography and a range of mental and non-communicable medical conditions (Blum, 2014). The correlation between distressed neighborhoods and health translates into profound differences in morbidity and mortality. In Baltimore, for example, there is an eighteen-year gap in life expectancy between the affluent, predominantly white neighborhood of Roland Park and the impoverished, predominantly black neighborhood of Hollins Market, though they are separated by less than ten miles (Blum, 2014).

The geographic distance between neighborhoods like Roland Park and Hollins Market belies their vast social, cultural, economic differences, which could just as well be a world apart. These differences also reveal how the constraining effects of geography translated into the all-encompassing isolation of ghetto life. Taking stock of this notion, Turner, *et al*. (2010) contend that an assumption of segregation has hobbled efforts to improve the lives of distressed families by narrowing the scope of available solutions.

Connecting residents of distressed communities with resources and services outside of their neighborhoods confronts a major cause of distress, segregation, and makes use of resources already in existence. To further illustrate their argument, Turner, *et al*. detail a multitude of programs that exemplify the "place-conscious" approach in contrast to the "place-based" approach. Turner, *et al*. fault the longstanding policy assumption that efforts at reforming distressed neighborhoods must be tied to their physical location, as opposed to instituting reforms that empower residents in ways that avail them of wider metropolitan opportunities and resources taken for granted by middle class community members.

South and Crowder (1997) offer a further analysis of the wider effects of isolation in distressed communities, confirming that geographic mobility is a resource that comparatively advantaged individuals and families can leverage in response to community distress. Through a statistical analysis of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which includes respondents in both poor and non-poor neighborhoods, South and Crowder (1997) find that "almost 80% of respondents who began an interval in a poor tract resided in the same tract at the end of the interval" (1058) and that lack of "socioeconomic resources…serve to retain those who already reside in nonpoor neighborhoods, while two life events-the disruption of a marriage and the loss of a job-substantially increase the risk of moving from a nonpoor into a poor area" (1078). "In both the poor and nonpoor tracts, black respondents are more likely than white respondents to be female, unmarried, renting their dwelling, and receiving public assistance" (1059). Meanwhile, geographic mobility is positively correlated with binary opposites of those traits: male, married, homeowner, and employed. Race is also a

strongly predictive factor: both poor whites and poor blacks face similarly low chances of moving in general, but when blacks do move, it is often to another poor neighborhood due to housing shortages while whites have greater chances of moving to a wealthier neighborhood due to increased income and marriage, suggesting a race-based differential in social mobility (1059).

On the particular matter of home rental versus ownership, the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University (2015) reports that the 2008 housing market crash disproportionately impacted poor and minority communities in terms of recovery time. While most of the country bounced back, poor minority neighborhoods remained under the conditions of the downturn. The trajectory of the recovery also has particular implications for distressed communities: trends toward renting, exceptionally low vacancy rates, and dense urban living arrangements such as multi-family homes create housing crises for the poor who face considerable constraints on their geographic mobility. "The extent of persistent housing market distress makes it clear that public efforts to remediate the effects of the housing crash must continue…majority-minority communities make up half of the neighborhoods where house prices and home equity remain furthest behind" (35).

Before moving to Section 2.0, we would be remiss if we did not highlight the deeply troubling and longstanding correlation between residency in distressed neighborhoods and what are collectively designated by the CDC, American Academy of Pediatrics, and other leading public health organizations as Adverse Childhood Experiences or "ACE" factors. ACE factors are as follows (AAP 2014:2):

1. Emotional abuse
2. Physical abuse

3. Sexual abuse
4. Emotional neglect
5. Physical neglect
6. Mother treated violently
7. Household substance abuse
8. Household mental illness
9. Parental separation or divorce
10. Incarcerated household member

The APA notes that while ACE factors are present in all demographic and geographic categories, the rates of ACE are much higher for people living in poverty (APA 2014:2). By way of a specific instance, the Philadelphia Urban Ace Study (ISF, 2013) was the first effort to analyze the relative prevalence ACE factors in a socioeconomically and racially diverse urban community, as opposed to earlier ACE research that sampled a predominantly white, middle-class population. Results from the Philadelphia study show a much higher occurrence of ACE factors among residents of poor urban neighborhoods, and point to a wider trend that merits closer attention.

Section 2.0 – Current Approaches to Understanding Leadership Gaps

With the overview of causes of neighborhood distress described in Section 1.0 in mind, it is now possible to consider more carefully and accurately the specific issue of leadership gaps in these communities. It is important here to begin by reiterating the quandary central to the challenge of addressing this leadership gap: the distressed neighborhoods that most urgently need stronger collaborative relationships with the criminal justice system have the hardest time building them (Dreier, 1996). This pattern is not unique to government-community partnerships around issues of public safety: it has long existed as well in other arenas such as health, education, housing and development.

Much of the effort to study and improve neighborhood leadership capacity has centered on the work of community development corporations (CDCs) and community-based development organizations (see Anglin, 2004). The community development movement grew out of the Civil Rights and anti-poverty movements of the 1950s and 1960s, and has achieved some notable successes at reversing urban blight and revitalizing distressed neighborhoods in both urban and rural areas (Anglin and Herts, 2004). With that said, the movement has also been marked by a contentious debate over how to achieve a balance between deploying the requisite outside technical expertise and resources necessary to address the complex challenges of urban redevelopment, while simultaneously recognizing the political and ethical imperative for empowering distressed communities to take the lead in their own revitalization.

The so-called "comprehensiveness movement" was animated by a desire to "put the community back in community development" (Sviridoff and Ryan 1996, cited in

Anglin and Herts, 2004:17). However, sounding a cautionary note with clear

implications for policing reform and similar collaborative criminal justice initiatives,

Anglin and Herts note that

> efforts at deeper neighborhood participation showed no particular benefit to
> community residents, regardless of the level of their involvement, if the residents
> do not possess the skills and experience to guide the community development
> process. A successful development process relies on professional skills and
> knowledge. Moreover, small, unorganized bands of well meaning individuals are
> of little use in the development process (2004:17-18).

What is true of housing reform and urban revitalization is equally true of issues of public

safety.

In his essay on the chronic failure of numerous police reform efforts, Skogan

(2008:31) identifies some of the structural impediments to closer community-police

collaboration typical of many distressed neighborhoods. His analysis is worth citing at

length:

> Civic participation is also generally difficult to sustain in worse-off places. Poor
> and high-crime areas are often not well endowed with an infrastructure of
> organizations ready to get involved in civic projects. Crime and fear stimulate
> withdrawal from community life. Residents easily view each other with suspicion
> rather than with neighborliness, and this undermines their capacity to forge
> collective responses to local problems. Because they fear retaliation by drug
> dealers and neighborhood gangs, programs requiring public meetings or organized
> cooperation may be less successful (Skogan 1988). In Chicago, there was
> discussion of potential retaliation for cooperating with police or attending beat
> meetings at 22 per cent of the meetings we observed (Skogan 2006). *As a result,
> areas that need the most help usually find it hardest to get people involved*
> [emphasis added].

It is important to remember that the challenge of neighborhood leadership and

community policing that Skogan describes dates back at least a generation. Writing in

1994, Robert Trojanowicz presciently argued that "community policing's future is

dependent on the government and the governed coalescing to identify needs that can be

addressed through a combination of government resources and citizen activism and

volunteerism" (Trojanowicz, 1994:258). Friedman (1994) takes a similar position, arguing that the role, knowledge, and effectiveness of communities are decisive for community policing if it is be a partnership in more than name alone. However, early indications revealed critical weaknesses in the ability of distressed communities to marshal the leadership necessary to undertake the complex and contentious tasks of reform and public safety.

For example, in 1990, BJA funded innovative neighborhood-oriented policing ("INOP") projects at a mix of eight urban and suburban communities aimed a reducing illegal drug demand. According to a subsequent NIJ-funded analysis of the INOP projects by Sadd and Grinc (1996), police departments at all eight sites struggled to organize and maintain community involvement. Sadd and Grinc contend that the apparent popularity of the community policing approach notwithstanding, neighborhood residents simply may not want closer interaction with the police or greater responsibility for maintaining social control. They found that "[d]espite acknowledgment by some residents (largely community leaders) of community policing as valuable, activism was generally confined to a small group of dedicated individuals" (1996:3). Sadd and Grinc (1996:12-13) suggest that while community solidarity and general pro-police sentiment may increase following police-sponsored cookouts and similar events, these are a weak substitute for substantive involvement of community stakeholders in collaborative problem-solving efforts and structured public safety initiatives.

Similar to Skogan's arguments, Sadd and Grinc identified the following reasons for community resistance to participating in the INOP projects: fear of retaliation, perception of projects as fleeting and transitory, historically poor community-police

relations in project cities, lack of effective police outreach, and most noteworthy for the

present report, weak community organization and intra-group conflict among community

groups. With respect in particular to the latter point, Sadd and Grinc observe that just

because people share a racial, ethnic, class or neighborhood identity does not necessarily

mean they have common values or a shared vision of how to address crime and disorder.

Sadd and Grinc argue that given the weak state of neighborhood leadership in

marginalized communities, collaborative policing initiatives must devote equivalent

resources to training both community leaders and police officers. They continue:

> Existing community organizations and leaders are the logical first audience, but it
> should be kept in mind that neighborhoods that commonly serve as community
> policing pilot sites generally have few viable community groups. The police, in
> concert with other public and private agencies, should create organization where it
> does not exist, although it may be argued that a high level of community
> organization is not necessary for community policing to function effectively
> (Sadd and Grinc, 1996:17).

As the preceding example illustrates, the quandary of ineffective neighborhood

leadership is a chronic one that has persisted since the early days of community policing.

The leadership gap also reflects manifestation of weak *collective efficacy* in

distressed neighborhoods, which Sampson, *et al*. (1997) and other researchers define as

the combined effect of social cohesion among neighbors and their willingness to

intervene by taking positive actions for the greater good. Examples of collective efficacy

include confronting negative neighborhood situations such as children skipping school

and loitering, a fight in front of one's residence, or a community fire station being slated

for closure due to budget cuts (Sampson, *et al*. 1997). Sampson, *et al*. (1997) found that

higher rates of collective efficacy are correlated with lower rates of violent crime,

including homicide.

Beyond increasing the likelihood of the kinds of face-to-face situational interventions that help contribute to lower rates of violence, collective efficacy also influences a neighborhood's civic capacity, as it is manifest in community mobilization. In neighborhoods where collective efficacy is weak, community mobilization often requires the external, top-down catalyst of government or non-profit intervention and support until neighborhood buy-in, support, and participation reach a sufficient level to enable bottom-up (grass roots) action (see Boyes-Watson, 2012:20ff). But Boyes-Watson and others (*e.g.* Lindenberg, *et al*., 2001) are skeptical that this objective is attainable in the limited context of public safety initiatives that do not pay wider to underlying socioeconomic issues, which residents in distressed communities identify as the root causes of crime in need of remedies beyond the scope of those deliverable by the criminal justice system. Plainly stated, residents of poor communities want stable jobs, affordable housing, and other basic elements of economic security as much as they want lower crime rates.

Foster-Fishman, *et al*. (2007) explore the challenges of neighborhood mobilization and resident participation in the implementation of community-building initiatives (CBIs). They find that

> resident perceptions of neighborhood readiness (i.e., hope for the future and collective efficacy) and capacity for change (i.e., social ties and neighborhood leadership), and the level of neighborhood problems were strongly related to whether and how much residents were involved in individual and collective action efforts (91).

Furthermore, their results showed that while residents' perception of neighborhood problems drove their initial involvement in collaborative community efforts, the actual extent of participation was most strongly predicted by perceptions of neighborhood

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leadership (Foster-Fishman, *et al*. 2007:91). In other words, glaring neighborhood issues prompted civic engagement; however, it took leadership to foster sustained involvement (Foster-Fishman, *et al*. 2007:96, 99, 101).

In a subsequent study, Foster-Fishman, *et al*. (2009) make the intuitive claim that a feeling of connection to one's neighbors and confidence about the feasibility of change tend to encourage active engagement (566). The study contributes to the understanding of civic participation by explaining how confidence and connectivity lead to a general sentiment of neighborhood involvement as a *social norm* (566). If people perceive that their neighbors are civically engaged, they are more likely to become engaged as well. In light of these dynamics, Foster-Fishman, *et al*. (2009) suggest that practitioners should be deliberative in targeting whom they initially engage to foster reform initiatives, and then focus specifically on the factors most likely to encourage this group's participation (567). They go on to say, "[p]roviding targeted training and opportunities for skill development is important for residents and may be one of the best means for encouraging greater participation among self-identified neighborhood leaders" who tend to participate more when they feel they have the skills necessary to tackle the problem at hand (567). Such efforts are even more important "in neighborhoods where community conditions are weak and residents lack normative expectations for participation" (568).

Aiyer, *et al*. (2015) suggest the idea of creating "busy streets" as a means of encouraging social cohesion, trust, social capital, and collective efficacy. Neighborhoods with "busy streets" facilitate and foster the requisite processes and structures for positive social interactions. Aiyer, *et al*. see evidence of "busy streets" in actively maintained, organized spaces, thriving businesses, and visible informal (and formal) social

interactions" (137). The advantage to the "busy streets" approach is that it works to empower communities so that they can institute informal social control.

This community empowerment has three components: intracommunity, interactional, and behavioral. The intracommunity component includes social relationships among neighborhood residents; the interactional component includes individual and organizational interactions that promote trust and social capital; and the behavioral component represents organizational collaboration between residents and organizations within communities and collective actions taken to improve neighborhoods (Aiyer, *et al*. 2015:140 - 142). Aiyer, *et al*. suggest that all three of components require active leadership, though not necessarily formal leaders. Leadership (role modeling, encouragement, hospitality, welcoming) at the intracommunity and interactional levels helps channel behavior in prosocial directions that fosters the kind of positive social context that leads to, and is in turn reinforced by, busy streets. Leadership at the behavioral level (supervision of children, peer feedback regarding unwanted behavior, role modeling) may also be a sustaining factor.

Leadership and collective efficacy also play a substantive role in anti-aggression programs. Cicchetti, *et al*. (2014:761) contend that "in order for aggression programs to be most effective, they should emphasize the promotion of community involvement and leadership." Community involvement and leadership skills are negatively correlated with a belief that violence is an effective way to solve disputes; therefore, programs that encourage prosocial skills are more likely to reduce violent behavior (769). However, the Ciccheti, *et al.* find that existing aggression reduction programs rarely emphasize community involvement and leadership. This means that such programs are less effective

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in distressed minority neighborhoods where community involvement and leadership are at a deficit compared to suburban white neighborhoods.

Ciccheti , *et al.* observe, "many aggression intervention programs that have been designed with suburban nonethnic minority youth in mind have been used or slightly adapted in order to try and meet the needs of high-risk urban youth" (759). The results of these efforts have been disappointing, and this study helps to explain why: high-risk urban youth need prosocial alternatives to violence, not more generic lessons on why violence should be avoided. There are clear wider implications here for leadership programs that could redirect and channel youth and young adult energy currently manifest in violent and criminal behavior into prosocial activities.

A study by Waasdorp, *et al.* (2014) finds evidence that aggression, both relational and overt, is positively associated with perceptions of leadership and higher social status in distressed neighborhoods. Waasdorp, *et al.* observe: "[r]esearch suggests that aggressive youth are not only considered popular in many cases, but they may also possess positive qualities such as being perceived as leaders" (265). Their findings show that among minority children in distressed neighborhoods, displays of aggressive behavior were associated with leadership as early as third grade. More specifically, their data show that "African-American males may strive for social dominance through asserting themselves and gaining control in a school setting by instilling fear and compliance; as such, being overtly aggressive may afford them a socially prominent position" (270). Given these circumstances, Waasdorp, *et al.* urge practitioners not just to help such children reduce their aggressive behavior, but also to try to redirect their potential leadership ability toward prosocial objectives (273). This study has wider

implications regarding the external "expert" perception of leadership gaps in distressed neighborhoods. In some instances, that gap may not be entirely one of leadership *per se*, so much as it is a more specific gap in prosocial leadership. Optimistically regarded, high-crime neighborhoods may have substantial unrealized potential for effective leadership, if it can only be channeled positively starting much earlier in life than many traditional leadership programs have thus far attempted to do.

Before moving to a consideration in Section 3.0 of specific leadership development programs, it is worth noting the enduring tension between efforts sponsored by government agencies as opposed to those run predominantly by activist organizations. Harwood (2007) exemplifies an important skeptical perspective, arguing that local activism that might bring about positive community change risks being weakened by government-sponsored neighborhood improvement plans. Harwood's argument illustrates the decades old debate between reform and activism, which though impossible to resolve, nonetheless cannot be ignored by policymakers. Particularly given historical legacies of mistrust between distressed neighborhoods and criminal justice agencies, credible leadership development efforts must seek to tap and channel the energy of activists who are willing to engage in participatory reform. The balancing act decisive to building community leadership development programs is to engage a cross-section of neighborhood stakeholders wide enough to include people who are vocally skeptical of the criminal justice system without alienating more mainstream residents. This entails a nuanced understanding of the demographic complexities of neighborhoods, and requires challenging erroneous assumptions that commonalities in race, socioeconomic status, or geography translate into shared visions of policy, ideology, or civic action.

Section 3.0 – Overview of Solutions, Programs, and Responses

Our literature review and research identified a substantial and troubling gap in leadership development programs specifically related to community safety and crime prevention in distressed neighborhoods. The majority of existing leadership development programs that we found tend to cluster around general challenges of community development, urban revitalization, public health, education, housing, and other issues where tensions and mistrust between marginalized communities and government agencies is relatively less acute than it tends to be around crime and criminal justice. While many of the strategies in nearly all of the leadership development programs we identified are transferable to the community safety arena, the challenge of building trust in distressed neighborhoods is a formidable issue the intractability of which is difficult to overstate. On that note, and to state prospectively what we describe in greater detail below in Section 5.0, we think there needs to be substantive, programmatic nexus between procedural justice initiatives and leadership development programs.

Section 3.1 – Strategic Background on Leadership Development Programs

Community leadership efforts typically center around three similar but distinct social objectives: organizing, empowering, and services provision (Dreier, 1996). In seeking to develop community leadership capacity, it is therefore important for policy makers to ask up front: *what kind of leadership, and toward what end*? Efforts to improve a community's ability to meet one of these objectives will not necessarily address the other two. A related crucial issue is the substantive form of the various programmatic responses to leadership gaps. McNeely (in Anglin, 2004) distinguishes among training, education, and technical assistance. **Training** refers to short, focused efforts at building

individual skills or imparting program-specific knowledge, usual during single session lasting from one hour up to one week. **Education** refers to programs that are longer in duration and focus on developing broader, discipline-based knowledge, comprehensive skills, and often a wider philosophical or normative framework. Education programs are offered by both academic and non-academic institutions; some are accredited, and some require formal "graduation" rather than a lower standard of "attendance and completion" typical of training programs. **Technical assistance** refers to support rendered either formally or informally in response to a specifically identified individual or organizational need. Technical assistance varies widely in scope, timeline, and project content. Whatever the various configurations of the numerous programs we identified, most of them are very limited in their length and content, and by extension, in their longer-term effects. Unfortunately, much of what is represented as leadership development is simply too fleeting and dilute to achieve much beyond transient boosts in participant self-confidence and perhaps a few skills.

Keating (2011) sheds light on efforts to create more lasting positive effects in her evaluation of community leadership programs in high-poverty rural areas. Her study used a quasi-experimental design and regression analysis to investigate the cognitive and behavioral effects of leadership development training on rural community leaders (n = 768) in six states. Keating finds that compared to a control group, leaders who completed community leadership training showed significant gains in the following key areas: Community Knowledge, Shared Future and Purpose, Civic Engagement, Community Commitment, Personal Growth and Efficacy, and Social Cohesion. Moreover, the effects

of training remained significant even after controlling for age, sex, income, education, and number of years living in the community.

To no surprise, her results showed that longer training programs generated stronger skills gains and related cognitive results. Additionally, skills training alone did not influence actual organizational performance nearly as much as hours spent on group projects and similar experiential efforts. Keating's study also generated insightful results about program sponsorship, showing that "no one type of sponsor [university extension, chamber of commerce, etc.] is better than others in terms of producing community leadership outcomes. Results showed that for all of the cognitive leadership outcomes and all of the behavioral leadership outcomes, sponsor type was found only to be a factor in the cognitive outcome of Shared Future and Purpose" (70). She finds that "wealthier individuals make fewer gains in community leadership cognitions over time, despite leadership program participation" (61).

Lower-income individuals actually display *more* personal growth and skill development when they engage in leadership programs than wealthier persons. Keating's results suggest a reframing of high-poverty areas as ripe for leadership development. She argues that findings from the study of cognitive changes support the notion that leadership can be learned and that effective leadership programs seem able to make leaders out of "ordinary" people (63).

Keating's assessment is hardly new. From about 1965 – 1977, many of the federal government's Great Society programs devoted substantial resources to training community volunteer leaders, staff, VISTA (Volunteers in Service to America) members, and resident paraprofessionals from distressed target communities. "These programs

helped train a significant number of community leaders who went on to manage social programs and in some cases, hold elective [sic] office" (McNeely, 214). During the Carter Administration, "[t]he Office of Neighborhood Development launched a $5 million program of short-term training offerings through a diverse set of contractors and an information program covering the basics of community-based development coupled with 125 Neighborhood Self-Help Development Grants. In 1982, the Development Training Institute (DTI), then a division of Public/Private Ventures in Philadelphia, created the National Internship in Community Economic Development. The program was the first sustained comprehensive education program for executive leadership of Community Development Corporations (CDCs). Starting in the mid-1980s, such efforts substantially contracted, and were replaced by arguably less ambitious efforts that sought to build community involvement, albeit without concomitant efforts at leadership development.

Writing at the turn of the 21st century, Smock (2000) contends that given the stark inequalities that characterize American society, "community organizations must do more than simply provide open, unmediated forums for citizen involvement" (472). She argues that a truly inclusive model of public life means providing poor, minority, and disenfranchised residents with the tangible skills they need to participate in civic activity and influence official decision-making processes. (472). With this in mind, Smock looks beyond civic organizations, such as neighborhood watch and neighborhood associations that merely offer access to public forums, and instead looks to more substantive organizational and leadership efforts that emphasize community participation in social change.

Smock (2000:48) offers a useful categorization of five community organization leadership models, each of which takes a distinct approach to leadership development. Smock's categories include the power-based model, feminist model, transformative model, the civic model, and the community-building model. The **power-based model** focuses on developing organization members' skills in public speaking, negotiation, strategic thinking, and political analysis. This model is exemplified by the well-known and influential work of Saul Alinsky (1971). Organizations following the power-based model work to identify and cultivate people with the energy, enthusiasm, and ability to be active leaders rather than just passive "seat-warmers" at community meetings and events. As Smock says (2000:52), "the goal of these efforts is to continually challenge people's comfort levels until they are confidently engaged in levels of leadership that they may have never thought possible." The power-based model relies heavily on mentoring, planning exercises and workshops, and detailed role-play scenarios that build community leaders' skills and confidence at dealing with complicated, controversial, and emotionally charged meetings and dialogues. Smock argues that while the power-based model is resource and staff intensive, it generates very impressive results in the form of highly confident and effective community organizers.

The **feminist model** is not actually feminist in content, but derives its name from the inspiration that it draws from the women's rights movement, which sought to consciously integrate women's private and public experiences into political action. In particular, the feminist model relies on support groups, relationship building, and personal sharing as initial foundations for building the leadership capacity needed to address community issues. Smock (2000:57) notes that the feminist model is well suited

to poor urban communities and communities of color, where women have informal but strong social networks. In contrast to the power-based model, which seeks out and develops people who are already vocal and confident, the feminist model is based on empowering people who tend to lack self-confidence and self-esteem.

Members of organizations that use the feminist model are often poor, under-educated, at-home mothers whose formal community involvement outside the home was largely non-existent before getting involved in leadership development. Where the power-based model seeks to develop leaders who can be vocal and opinionated, the feminist model aims to create leaders who can generate consensus and provide mutual support within and beyond their network. The feminist model works via support groups that foster members' personal objectives (*e.g.* high school completion or stable employment) as means of empowering them for wider community leadership roles.

The **transformative model** aims at improving neighborhood residents' critical thinking skills in order to build the deeper self-awareness, social awareness, and strategic imagination essential to providing community leadership in support of positive change. The transformative model is based on radical theories of social criticism (*e.g.* Freire, 2007), according to which people must "demythologize" their everyday situations and experiences. Only from the resulting perspective of heightened critical reflection can people be fully empowered to identify and advance down paths of reform. The primary tool of the transformative model is public forums and workshops on urgent community issues that seek to challenge commonplace assumptions and open the possibility of effective change.

The **civic model** relies primarily on self-initiated volunteering and self-motivation rather than recruited involvement and structured training. Under the civic model, interested community members become involved with an organization and proactively step into roles that need to be filled. The civic model provides a way for natural leaders to extend their talents and skills sets by taking on tasks that need completion; however, it provides little structure or support. According to Smock, the civic model largely appeals to middle-class, educated professionals with prior leadership experience. While at first glance the civic model might seem relatively ill suited to the needs of distressed neighborhoods, we note the important phenomenon of affluent and upper-middle class African-American professionals living in or close to distressed neighborhoods. These are the kinds of stakeholders who could serve as anchors in wider efforts to improve leadership capacity.

Smock's **community-building** model is much like the civic model of leadership, in that it focuses on wider group empowerment rather than development of individual leadership skill. The community-building model follows a communitarian ideal that emphasis group and organizational unity and effectiveness. According to Smock (2000:85), one of the effects of this focus is that the community-building model tends to be the least effective at improving individual leadership skills.

While Smock's five-model taxonomy is not definitive, it illustrates the breadth and variety of leadership development models and suggests some of their various benefits and limitations. Beyond her taxonomy, it is important to note that while the catch-all category of "leadership development programs" encompasses many worthwhile and effective initiatives, it also includes a far greater number of efforts that do little more than

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give fleeting exposure to rudimentary knowledge, skills, and attitudes without offering any sustainable infrastructure for meaningful implementation. In selecting programs for the overview that follows in the sections below, we have therefore tried to separate the "wheat from the chaff," and exclude well-meaning but superficial efforts that do not appear to hold meaningful promise for tangibly addressing the needs of distressed neighborhoods. For the sake of convenience, we have organized programs into several different categories. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive and have fairly porous boundaries.

3.2 – Neighborhood Leadership Programs & Similar Efforts

Several cities across the country operate **Neighborhood Leadership Programs (NLPs)** with a generally similar approach to building community leadership capacity. NLPs typically offer leadership classes oriented around fostering a common set of skills related to public communication, conflict resolution, problem solving, neighborhood improvement project, advocacy, and introductory grant writing. Some NLPs, such as those in New York City and New Haven, CT are largely aimed more at people who already have a substantive degree of skilled community involvement, such as ownership of a small business or active participation in a neighborhood association or civic group.[2] Other programs, such as the Long Beach (CA) NLP, are specifically intended to reach potential but relatively unskilled leaders in distressed neighborhoods.

Ayon and Lee (2009) evaluated the **Long Beach NLP**, and found it to be generally effective at increasing the leadership skills of participants and sustaining their civic involvement despite the high-risk urban environment in which they live. A majority

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[2]For information on the New York City NLP, see
http://www.nyc.gov/html/sbs/html/neighborhood_development/neighborhood_leadership_program_ndd.shtml). For New Haven, see http://www.cfgnh.org/LeadingOnIssues/NeighborhoodLeadership.aspx.

of the participants were Latino (76%) and female (67%) (981). NLP training uses a free, five-month, thirteen session class to provide neighborhood residents with skills and knowledge that support local empowerment, including conflict resolution, human relations, fundraising and development, public speaking, and advocacy.

Long Beach NLP training sessions have a mandatory attendance requirement, and consist of bi-weekly meetings, a weekend retreat, and another full weekend session. The Long Beach NLP offers classes in three languages including English, Khmer, and Spanish. A demographically diverse team of social workers and other community practitioners provide staffing and other teaching resources for NLP. The program is funded by a combination of federal community development block grants and corporate donations. According to Ayon and Lee, the results of their evaluation "indicated that participants not only benefited in the short run from an intensive neighborhood leadership program, but also many members continued to exert positive change efforts in their communities" (984).

Neighborhood Leadership Cleveland (NLC) started in 1994 and is the flagship leadership program of the Neighborhood Leadership Institute. Conducted in partnership with Cleveland State University, NLC teaches a range of skills, including building relationships, effective communication, team building, group leadership, project development, goal setting, and change facilitation. The NLC program also addresses wider issues such as self-awareness, ethics, community organizing, government and system structures, policy and advocacy, equity and equality, research and funding for projects, and the role of community leadership.

NLC runs a separate program called Youth Leadership Cleveland (YLC), which provide youth-specific leadership development workshops that building empowerment through exploration of personal values, service learning and college readiness, and communication and conflict resolution skills. Five YLC participants are selected each year from the City of Cleveland's twenty-one municipal recreation centers, yielding an annual program cohort of 110 youth. After completing YLC, youth become "citizen-facilitators" responsible for finding and creating opportunities to put their leadership skills into meaningful action. We did not locate any formal evaluation data for either of the Cleveland programs.

Scheffert (2007) studies and evaluates **U-Lead**, the University of Minnesota Extension's community leadership program, using a survey instrument to measure the association between individual leadership outcomes and program duration. She finds unsurprising evidence that program duration is a significant factor in the success of community leadership efforts: longer programs correlate with measurably superior skills and knowledge among participants. However, commitment to post-program community leadership was not increased following longer duration programs, suggesting that commitment seems to operate independently of how long participants are trained. Based on survey data of participants in programs of diverse duration, Scheffert concludes that "program length does matter…the longer the program, the more skill and knowledge outcomes can be expected… programs 18 months or longer were transformational" (187). The same appears true in reverse: the shorter the program, the less the developed the leader.

Mandarano (2015) studied five "**Planning Academies**" aimed at improving residents' capacity to effectively engage in city and local planning activities (174). The study seeks to understand the impact of the academies on civic engagement and community empowerment. The academies collaborate with local planning agencies and provide training to both new as well as established community leaders. According to Mandarano, *et al*., "the Academies studied are successful at improving a broad spectrum of individual-level capacities that enable participants to become more active in their communities by taking actions that may result in long-term improvements in quality of life in the communities represented" (185). The Academies appeared to have a positive effect on skills acquisition and network development, as well as on actual "changes in civic behavior" (185). The findings of this study suggest that planning academies may be a useful outlet for emerging leaders in distressed communities beset by urban planning issues.

On a scale more ambitious than the planning academy concept, Saville (2009) describes the proprietary **SafeGrowth™** model of neighborhood development that he founded in Canada, and which was first implemented in a distressed Toronto neighborhood. SafeGrowth has since been used as well in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Of primary significance for the present report is SafeGrowth's use of a five-step planning model, the first of which is community engagement. Saville (2009) argues that community engagement means going beyond holding crime prevention workshops, and instead requires identifying local leaders and forming residents into groups that can learn and apply crime prevention and community development skills. SafeGrowth relies heavily on the concept of CPTED (Crime Prevention Through

Environmental Design), according to which improvements in the physical environment such as lighting, fencing, pathways, plantings, and other design features are built so as to discourage criminal activity. SafeGrowth trains local residents in the basics of CPTED and team building in a program that consists of two 2-day workshops followed by a two-month long project that involves community-police collaboration to address issues of neighborhood safety and crime prevention.

SafeGrowth organizes residents into "Neighborhood Safety Teams" (NST) through partnerships with various local associations and intermediaries. The NSTs then collaborate with planning experts to craft neighborhood revitalization plans. Crime and safety are the focus of this program, distinguishing it from more general planning academies. The underlying premise of the program is that residents learn how to create and self-regulate their own safety in collaboration with service providers and prevention experts. A key goal of the program is "not for experts to apply prevention strategies to problems, but rather for neighbours themselves to work with experts to learn how to create safe, vital and sustainable places" (387). Saville argues that by empowering local residents, the SafeGrowth model contributes to "the social capital that results in a sustainable and safe neighborhood" (390). SafeGrowth is similar to CBPR-based programs that bring integrate community members into the urban planning process as researchers and decisions-makers regarding their own neighborhoods.

3.3 – Community-Based Participatory Research (CBPR) Programs

There are a number of programs that rely on a **CBPR approach**. In general, CBPR programs are built on an equal partnership model according to which project stakeholders equally share authority and responsibility for all aspects of the project. CBPR is most

common in public health, but has been employed in other domains as well. According to Israel, *et al*. (2003), CBPR programs incorporate the following nine core traits: treat community as a unit of identify; builds on community strengths and resources; facilitate equitable partnership and power-sharing that is mindful of social inequalities; foster capacity building among all partners; integrate knowledge generation and intervention efforts; focus on the local relevance of critical problems and attend to their complex, multiple causes; involve a cyclical and iterative process; collaboratively disseminates results to all partners; and commit to a long-term, sustainable process.

Albeit with a small pilot group, the **Community Advocacy and Leadership Program (CALP)** in South Carolina showed promising results in a CBPR-based effort to improve the ability of community advocates from distressed neighborhoods to participate in activities such as meeting facilitation and grant writing (Sharpe, *et al.* 2015). The aim of the CALP project was "to develop and pilot test an educational, capacity-building program that enabled community advocates to assess existing human and community assets and apply new knowledge and skills to address community health issues" (114). The Community Advocacy and Leadership Program (CALP) consists of eight, half-day monthly workshops, a mini-grant opportunity, and technical assistance. Evaluation consisted of a self-assessment and a follow-up, unannounced post-test. We caution that there were only six participants in this project; however, the positive results are consistent with other efforts of this kind.

Hillstrom, *et al*. (2014) evaluate the **Keck Diabetes Prevention Initiative (KDPI),** which uses CBPR to address the high prevalence of diabetes and obesity in low-income minority neighborhoods. They note that, "CBPR can be an effective means of

empowering stakeholders to address issues affecting the health and well-being of their communities" (1430). KDPI illustrates how CBPR-based efforts are conducive to building community leadership, insofar as residents are vital components of the knowledge-production process and the eventual solution to the problem. This study provides more evidence that "CBPR is an empowering research methodology which, done correctly, can build community capacity and have a long-term impact on individuals and communities" (1435).

Section 3.4 – Grassroots Leadership Programs & Related Efforts

A Kellogg Foundation report (2001) on twenty-three local, state, and national **grassroots leadership efforts** all of which received Kellogg Foundation funding presents a number of findings and recommendations salient to the challenge of building capacity in distressed neighborhoods. The most insightful and significant recommendation is that developing grassroots leaders requires a "**triple focus**" on individual leaders, their organizations, and the underlying social issue itself (Kellogg Foundation, 2001:6).

Writing in the Kellogg report, Rinku Sen makes a crucial distinction between "grassroots" leadership and traditional "positional" leaders. Sen argues that fostering grassroots leadership requires special kinds of development and support. Programs that seek to develop grassroots leaders must "exercise patience and a willingness for longer timeframes," and must "meet community leaders where they are" (13). Sen also emphasizes the importance of recognizing the difference between leadership *identification* and leadership *development*. Programs can do both, Sen argues, but must be clear in differentiating between strategies intended to teach skills to emerging leaders, and those intended to identify best candidates for training and engagement.

Sen holds up two grassroots-led organizations, People United for a Better Oakland (PUEBLO) and Korean Immigrant Workers Association (KIWA), as examples of successful community organizing efforts. Through effective leveraging of grassroots leadership, PUEBLO fought for increased power of a community police review board. KIWA successfully defeated an anti-affirmative action proposition. Sen credits effective use of grassroots leadership, and the significant moral authority that comes with it, as crucial to these successful campaigns.

Another of the more intensive grassroots programs and success stories highlighted in the Kellogg report is a yearlong, Baltimore-based leadership program called the Leadership and Community Building Fellowship. The program is run by the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA), and goes beyond the scope of other more limited CPHA leadership and civic involvement program:

> This program consists of three parts: a three-session self-assessment and strategy clinic to develop learning goals and determine readiness for the program; a six-month series of training on leadership skills and strategies held on one Saturday and one evening per month; and a four-month practicum where skills are applied towards a specific goal and project developed in the preceding classes. Teams of two to four people from eight to 12 neighborhood associations or coalitions attend annually. Besides the in-class learning opportunities, participants have limited access to technical assistance for their organization while in the workshop (Kellogg Foundation, 2001:49).

Programs such as the Leadership and Community Building Fellowship are also noteworthy for their effort at preparing neighborhood leaders to go beyond isolated, short-term projects and take a proactive role in addressing wider civic issues.

In a related example, Satterwhite, *et al*. (2007) present case studies of two San Francisco Bay Area organizations that take a "**culturally-based**" approach to leadership capacity building in communities of color. The analysis starts from the premise that

externally developed leadership initiatives can unwittingly impose incongruous cultural values on a community, which can actually worsen existing social fragmentation worse, or lead to rejection of the program. The organizations featured in the case studies are **One East Palo Alto (OEPA)** and **Asian Immigrant Women Advocates (AIWA)**. With expert assistance from the National Community Development Institute (NCDI) and affiliated Community Development Institute (CDI), NCDI and CDI staff engaged with the residents, organizational, faith-based, and civic leaders from East Palo Alto's three primary ethnic populations (Latino, African-American, and Pacific Islander), and then initiated a series of weekly community forums on key issues such as education, housing, and police/community relations. A core group of thirty to forty people consistently attended the forums, and a community advisory group was then convened from their ranks.

AIWA's mission is to improve the living and working conditions of low-income Asian immigrant women and their families through education, leadership development, and collective action. AIWA fosters leadership development among low-income immigrant women and youth using "replicated peer trainings." AIWA's program focuses on outreach activities, literacy and computer classes, leadership development and skills training programs, health and safety workshops, and campaign internships.

Both organizations seek to develop leaders from within the communities they serve. Planning meetings that involved the community were more successful when they included culturally appropriate elements (food, attire, rituals, music, etc.) that communicated cultural sensitivity, authenticity, and appreciation. The wider implications

of the cases of OEPA and AIWA are that attention must be paid to tailoring leadership development programs to the demographic specificities of each neighborhood.

3.5 – Remote Delivery & Self-Directed Programs

While most of the programs we located involve "boots on the ground" in distressed neighborhoods, there are a few programs that are specifically designed for remote delivery and self-directed learning. In an example of a program designed for distressed rural communities, the **Brushy Fork Institute (BFI)** at Berea College has worked in central Appalachia to develop leadership skills and community capacity. BFI's community leadership curriculum includes eight self-delivered modules, which are designed for use by local volunteers, who in turn recruit local participant groups of 15-20 people, and then facilitate learning of the modules materials. The curriculum can be adapted to specific community needs. Program materials are accessible online for a nominal fee of two hundred and fifty dollars. Results from this program are not available.

The **University of Missouri Extension Program** takes a similar approach in their "**Step Up to Leadership Program**," which includes facilitator and user guides and supporting materials, accessible for download upon payment of a nominal fee. The UM program consists of twelve modules, which focus on topics such as self-awareness, diversity, meeting facilitation, public speaking, planning, and funding access skills. The program also has supplemental materials available that contain further readings, role play exercises, and other training resources. While it addresses topics generally relevant to community leadership, the UM program is specifically intended to prepare novices to serve effectively on local organizational boards. While there are obvious cost and

logistical benefits to remote or self-directed programs, they are obviously more limited in their ability to create a learning environment where mentorship and role modeling can take center stage.

3.6 – Programs that Leverage Marginalized Community Members & Leaders

Although they are not conceived as leadership development efforts, we see substantial promise and wider potential applicability for violence reduction initiatives that capitalize on the leadership skills and influence of street-level outreach workers who have indisputable life experience and credibility with high-risk residents.

One of the most innovative and decidedly controversial of these efforts is the **Cure Violence** (formerly "**CeaseFire**") violence interruption program. The National Gang Center (https://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/spt/programs/139) rates Cure Violence as an "effective program" in light of evaluations conducted in several cities that all use various versions of the violence interruption model. The Cure Violence program was first implemented in Chicago with some generally encouraging results analyzed by Skogan, *et al*. (2008). Henry, *et al*. (2014) subsequently conducted a quantitative analysis of two years' worth of activity by the Cure Violence program in Chicago. According to its own description, Cure Violence aims to:

> (1) locate and interrupt local and ongoing conflicts using conflict mediation techniques, (2) change behaviors of high risk participants, and (3) organize activities and events in the community aimed at changing norms accepting of violence (4). Trained violence interrupters and outreach workers prevent shootings by identifying and mediating potentially lethal conflicts in the community, and following up to ensure that the conflict does not reignite (http://cureviolence.org/the-model/essential-elements/).

Outreach workers and violence interrupters are "culturally-appropriate," meaning they are drawn from similar backgrounds as those found in the community they serve. Their primary tool is conflict mediation, which hinges almost entirely on the leadership and influence ability of outreach workers and interrupters. Skogan (2008:110) notes how Cure Violence interrupters "capitalized on their former [criminal and gang] leadership roles to hear about and mediate conflicts." According to Henry, *et al*., the positive effects of Cure Violence intervention "are significantly greater than the effects that would be expected given the declining trends in crime in the city as a whole" (2014:9). These measurements of the overall efficacy of Cure Violence are suggestive of the wider potential applicability of leadership development programs on crime-reduction initiatives.

To the credit and success of Cure Violence, the program has a well-developed training, mentorship, and supervision for its cadre of outreach workers and interrupters to equip them with tools to leverage the informal leadership skills that most of them have learned from experience on the street. In a careful discussion with implications for other organizations, Skogan (2008:52ff.) describes in detail the many challenges of staffing and training that Cure Violence continuously faces. Cure Violence leadership has struggled at times to find candidates for interrupter and outreach worker positions who have both the basic skills necessary to function in a professional workplace as well as enough "street savvy" to earn credibility with skeptical gang members in target neighborhoods (Skogan, 2008:55 and 217).

Once hired, Cure Violence outreach workers receive six days (48 hours) of initial training followed by two-hour monthly sessions and regular supervisory meetings (2008:62). Training combines classroom learning with "hands-on" exercises in which

new staff members join experienced outreach workers for client contact, neighborhood canvassing, and responding to shootings. Interrupters themselves receive little formal training. Indeed, Skogan found that the idea offended some interrupters, who felt that their own life experience gave them all the skills they needed to mediate potentially deadly conflicts. To overcome this resistance, Cure Violence used former gang members to conduct and mediate training sessions (2008:66).

Cure Violence staff and police both continually struggle with mutual mistrust and deep skepticism about each other's legitimacy and intentions. Staff also struggle with the constant threat of budget cuts that imperiled their jobs, which increased the temptation to return to illicit activities such as drug dealing. But in the end, observes Skogan (2008:69), Cure Violence "provided an important opportunity for its street staff: redemption in communities where they were active as drug dealers, gunners, gang members and street leaders."

Webster, *et al*. (2012) studied Baltimore's **SafeStreets** program, a replication of Chicago's Cure Violence that also positions informal community leadership at the core of its efforts. In addition to their efforts at violence mediation and interruption, SafeStreets, "street outreach workers – often former gang members – develop relationships with high risk youth in high crime urban areas. . . serving as positive role models for the young people" (2). SafeStreets staff serve as de facto community leaders in their efforts to "[organize] community responses to shootings [in an] attempt to change social norms surrounding shootings" (2). In addition, "outreach workers make referrals for services, which include assistance with employment, education, housing, mental health, and substance abuse, among other services" (36). Thus, without formally acknowledging

community building theories such as "collective efficacy" or "civic capacity," SafeStreets attempts to advance both through leveraging reserves of leadership potential within high-risk urban neighborhoods.

With respect to the present report, one of more pertinent aspects of Webster, *et al*'s. evaluation of SafeStreets is their assessment of the extent to which outreach workers were able to successfully change attitudes concerning gun violence, which are best encapsulated in the concept of "the code of the street" and its emphasis on protecting honor and reputation and the perceived need to avenge all slights, however outwardly insignificant. Outreach workers' ability to do can be seen this is an indication of their leadership efficacy. After exposure to SafeStreets, "youth in each of the neighborhoods studied tended to think that their friends were much more accepting of using guns to settle grievances than they themselves were" (31). Overall "the program was associated with less acceptance for using guns to settle grievances in the one intervention neighborhood where attitudes were studied in two waves of community surveys" (40). This preliminarily suggests that the leadership influence of SafeStreets outreach workers may have community-wide benefits.

Fox, *et al*. (2012) evaluated the efficacy of **TRUCE**, Phoenix's version of the Cure Violence program. Their study also provides useful evaluative summations of the various versions of Cure Violence fielded in Chicago, Newark, Baltimore, and Pittsburgh. Fox, *et al*. provide further evidence that the Cure Violence public health model of violence reduction offers a viable means of leveraging the leadership skills and influence of non-traditional leaders in distressed neighborhoods. The evaluation of TRUCE also highlights the extent to which the Cure Violence approach depends on

effective community mobilization and a transformation of social norms related to the acceptability of violence.

TRUCE's violence interrupters reported that 47 of the 58 (90%) conflicts that they mediated resulted in at least a temporary resolution, matching similar findings in other cities and suggesting that the social legitimacy and competence of the violence interrupters enables them to successfully fulfill their role (Fox, *et al*. 2012:97). But despite its micro-level, street-level effectiveness, TRUCE as a whole experienced difficulty gaining wider and deeper community traction. Fox, *et al*. describe this lack of community mobilization in detail:

> While some stakeholders met frequently, at least once a month, a community-wide advisory board was never established. This resulted in lack of strategic direction for the program and reduced the program's capacity to mobilize larger institutions within the community. Similarly, interviews indicated that coordination and collaboration between TRUCE and the faith-based community was largely absent from the project. This necessarily resulted in fewer opportunities for clients to access jobs and services, and a reduced the capacity of TRUCE to present its message of anti-violence (Fox, *et al*. 2012:97)

In light of these findings, Fox, *et al*. recommended that TRUCE strengthen its community partnerships, especially with faith leaders and the police (104). While these recommendations are sound, they also point to a wider potential need for external support to foster community-based leadership.

Gebo, *et al*. (2015) summarize OJJDP's **Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM)**, which is not a single program, but rather a flexible, adaptable "conceptual structure" intended to provide a "coherent way to identify and organize agencies and services toward a common goal" (392). The CGM relies on a broad spectrum of tactics and approaches: we call particular attention here to community mobilization, which aims at coordination of community members and leaders with formal agencies.

Under the CGM, community mobilization efforts are primarily assigned to joint steering committees that aim to inject "community voice" into formal decision-making (400). The CGM places strong emphasis on leveraging influential prosocial community forces such as business owners and church leaders into gang intervention efforts. As such, the CGM does not emphasize developing new leaders from the ranks of community members, but rather seeks to rely on existing pool of leadership. Despite the importance that the CGM places on community mobilization, Gebo, *et al*. note the perennial challenges to effective implementation of such collaborative efforts. Without genuine participation from a broad and representative spectrum of community leaders, the CGM cannot work. Among other things, this means treating local leaders as equal partners both in word and in deed, and engaging with groups that have longstanding poor relationships with the criminal justice system (Gebo, *et al*. 401). Gebo, *et al*. find cause for hope in the potential compatibility between the CGM and public health approaches to violence reduction of the kind exemplified by Cure Violence.

Section 3.7 – Youth Leadership Development Programs

As the preceding section suggests, the efficacy of many violence and gang reduction programs relies on engaging the small sub-population of youth and young adults who are deeply enmeshed in networks of criminal activity. More broadly, distressed neighborhoods urgently need programs to foster and channel the civic capacity of the vast majority of young people who are not criminally involved. As Brennan (2009) argues:

> Youth represent a vast and often untapped resource for contributing to immediate and long-term community development efforts. A reciprocal benefit is also seen, where youth obtain skill enhancement, confidence building, and leadership development through their collaborations with adults and community organizations. These interactions between youth and adults lead to the development of social networks essential to the development of community and

the expansion of youth capacities.

With this assessment in mind, we consider here several programs that have made notable progress at engaging and empowering youth in distressed communities.

Christens and Dolan (2011) studied and evaluated a California youth leadership program, **Inland Congregations United for Change (ICUC)**. ICUC works through faith-based intermediaries in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties, and is an affiliate of the umbrella organization People Improving Communities through Organizing (PICO), a faith-based national coordinator for community organizers. ICUC was launched following the high-profile death of a local sixteen year-old girl in a drive-by shooting with the hope of channeling community anger in positive directions. Since then, ICUC has grown into a sustained effort to facilitate youth leaders and encourage a "holistic approach" to public safety "focused on improving everyday opportunities and supports in the community" (533). ICUC initiated a campaign to shift local resources away from punitive and toward supportive responses to youth in crisis, and to providing the support and opportunities necessary for building a "pathway to hope" (533).

Through a combination of interviews and documentary analysis of media coverage, Christens and Dolan found that ICUC was perceived as positively influencing relationships between youth and adults, as well as across cultures and faiths, which suggests a programmatic impact on collective efficacy and civic capacity (536-538). They also found that participants in ICUC programs experienced psychological empowerment, leadership development, and sociopolitical development (539-541). Christens and Dolan conclude that "[ef]fective youth organizing, therefore, can be understood as a multilevel intervention that affects both its participants (positive youth

development, leadership development) and the broader community (community development)" (544).

Griffith, *et al*. (2008) studied and evaluated the **Michigan Youth Violence Prevention Center (MI-YVPC)** in Flint. The MI-YVPC is one of six such centers in the country funded by the CDC to encourage community-based, public health approaches to youth violence reduction. Like the programs summarized above in Section 3.3, MI-YVPC specifically uses a community-based participatory research (CBPR) approach. MI-YVPC combines intra-, inter-organizational, and extra-organizational relationships into a single coalition, the mission of which is to take collaborative approaches to preventing youth violence. Griffith, *et al*. describe how the CBPR approach taken in the YVPC integrates a diverse, culturally attuned, and holistic team of partners in a manner that

> increases the relevance, usefulness, and quality of intervention research and resulting programs; improves all partners' research and program development capacity; and enhances the potential to overcome distrust of research by communities that have historically been the focus of such research (97).

To no surprise, Griffith, *et al*. find that when community members are valued for their knowledge they are more likely to take on leadership qualities and a sense of civic responsibility. And when this logic of empowerment is directed at youth in particular, the results is trained cadre of youth advocates who can substantively influence the direction of violence prevention efforts (96).

We also want to call attention to a study by Miao, *et al*. (2011:128) that examines the use of community engagement and mobilization in the implementation of evidence-based practices to reduce youth violence in Hawaii under the auspices of the CDC-funded **Asian-Pacific Islander Youth Violence Prevention Center (API)**. Miao, *et al*. list the

following elements of community leadership development that they saw as critical to API's success: training activities and subsidies for community members to attend them, project-specific training by outside agencies, encouraging more active involvement by existing leaders, and encouraging active participants to assume greater leadership roles. The authors contend that the API exemplifies fidelity to evidence-based principles by leveraging community leaders as active partners and as evaluators of the program's efficacy. API puts particular emphasis on continually encouraging participants to assume greater leadership roles (128).

Kirshner (2008) presents a descriptive analysis that compares and contrasts three youth leadership programs: **Youth Engaged in Leadership and Learning (YELL), Youth Rising,** and **Teens Restoring the Urban Environment (TRUE)**. All three programs operate in distressed urban communities and seek to improve civic engagement skills of low-income youth of color. YELL was developed in cooperation with Stanford University, and primarily uses a facilitation-based approach that aligns with the program's core objective of producing capable and independent youth leaders. YELL emphasizes the development of both leadership and research skills necessary to address community issues in substantive ways. Youth Rising is affiliated with a non-profit grassroots advocacy group and employs an apprenticeship (coaching) model that balances leadership development with the success of campaigns around actual community issues. TRUE uses "joint work" between youth and adults (termed "senior colleagues"), and focuses solely on campaign success rather than on the training of individual youth, which is incidental.

Kirshner concludes his study with four useful "design principles" for creating youth civic engagement programs: (1.) start with an authentic civic problem; (2.) provide access to mature civic participation activities; (3.) be responsive to youth skill levels and interests; and (4.) plan for long-term time frames of at least six months to enable meaningful participation and learning (93-96). Kirshner also notes that in each program of the three programs he examined, significant tensions developed between youth participants and adult facilitators: adults wanted projects to be youth-led but also felt the need to control complex processes, while youth wanted autonomy albeit tempered with guidance.

Section 3.8 – Overseas Leadership Development Programs

Some of the most thorough, well-designed programs we identified were created under the auspices of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) for delivery to communities in Third World countries in support of public health initiatives and post-conflict stabilization. Under the direction of USAID's Leadership, Management, and Governance Project (LMG), Management Sciences for Health (MSH) has developed an extensive and widely used series of meticulously detailed curricula and programs of instruction that far exceed the depth, breadth, and quality of many of the materials we located for domestic leadership development programs.[3] A key example is the ***Guide for Training Community Leaders to Improve Leadership and Management Practices***, which MSH was commissioned by USAID to write for use in rural villages in Central and South America (Galdos, *et al*. 2008). The guide is the end product of an independently evaluated pilot program that delivered leadership training workshops to

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[3] MSH website: https://www.msh.org/.

260 local leaders from thirty rural Nicaraguan communities. The program was subsequently delivered on a larger scale in Peru, where it was used to train 1200 leaders from 380 communities. The MSH program pilot was delivered in the form of a 40-hour curriculum (five units x eight hour instructional blocks) held several weeks apart. The program made allowances for logistical considerations such as accommodations for attendees traveling long distances to the training site, and the need to provide childcare so women leaders with young children could participate.

Noteworthy for BJA's purposes is the fact that the grounding conditions for implementation of the MSH program are characterized by low social capital and civic participation, as well as by socioeconomic and socio-psychological stressors associated with post-conflict societies (Galdos, *et al*. 2008 and Brune and Bossert, 2009). While there are obviously vast differences that cannot be overlooked between rural Nicaraguan villages and distressed neighborhoods in the United States, we nonetheless think there is much of relevance and value to glean from the MSH program and similar materials in optimizing new leadership development programs. Among other elements, the MSH program specifically incorporates exercises and opportunities for reconciliation, forgiveness, and conflict resolution. The MSH program also makes extensive use of role play exercises, practical scenarios, contests, guided discussions and storytelling, and a range of other activities that reflect sensitive, nuanced attention to cultural context.

In a separate and much larger USAID-funded effort similar to the community leaders pilot curriculum, MSH has created the Leadership Development Program (LDP) and its more recent successor program, Leadership Development Plus (LDP+), to foster leadership skills at every level of health care systems in Third World and post-conflict

countries (MSH, 2014). LDP and LDP+ have been used in dozens of countries, including

some of the most destabilized and challenged nations in the world. LDP and LDP+ were

specifically developed to align with United Nations "Millennium Development Goals"

(MDGs) first outlined in 2000 and planned for significant measurable progress by 2015.

LDP+ has focused in particular on MDGs 4, 5, and 6, which focus respectively on

reducing child mortality, improving maternal health, and combating the spread of

HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. In light of the growing emphasis in the U.S. on

epidemiological models of crime and violence, and the increasingly apparent nexus

between crime and a host of correlated social and medical co-morbidities (see Akers, *et

al*. 2013 and Waltermaurer and Akers, 2013), we see a strong potential point of

confluence between the LDP+ effort and domestic leadership development needs.

The core of LDP+ consists of team-based workshops that run from five to eight

months in length, and focus on successful implementation of actual ground-level health

care services. LDP+ explicitly distinguishes itself from traditional leadership programs:

> This approach to leadership development differs from traditional leadership
> training programs that introduce leadership theories and behaviors in a course
> setting. The LDP+ improvement process links learning to the implementation of
> actions that achieve measurable public health results. Teams not only initiate
> changes but they carefully monitor the results of those changes over time (MSH
> 2014:11).

In taking this approach, LDP+ relies heavily on a three-part experiential learning process

that integrates a continuous cycle of challenge, feedback, and support. LDP+ also

incorporates evidence-based performance improvement models, and a "Challenge

Model" that is specifically designed to help achieve measurable results even in highly

adverse social and political environments. The LDP+ Facilitator's Guide (MSH 2014) is

over 500 pages long and contains detailed guidelines, instructions, and other material that would be immediately applicable in wider training contexts. To propagate wider delivery, MSH has also developed a six-month train-the-trainer program for LDP+ called the "Training of Facilitators" (TOF) workshop.

We also want to call attention to several evaluations of programs aimed at building trust and social capacity in post-conflict societies. A study by Pronyk, *et al*. (2008) seeks to determine if social capital, which the authors define as "solidarity, reciprocity and social group membership," can be intentionally generated. Despite the ample theoretical work regarding social capital, this is one of the few studies to address this vital practical issue. Researchers devised a randomized study in which several South African communities hosted a program called "Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity" (IMAGE) that provides women with microfinance credit in support their income-generating activities (1561).

While IMAGE did not directly seek to enhance leadership capacity, the women who successfully gained microloans through IMAGE not only displayed initial leadership potential, they also became community leaders by way of their ensuing financial success. In this way, IMAGE bolstered community leadership as part of overall boost in community social capital. Results of the project decisively showed that providing microloan credit to address community needs helped create social capital, even in the face of extreme poverty and the lingering effects of socially destabilizing labor migration. Moreover, the communities demonstrated sustained increases in economic capacity and independence. This study makes an important contribution to the understanding of social capital – it can be intentionally generated through targeted interventions. The

implications are that efforts to address the consequences of poverty can do so by increasing social capital.

Section 3.9 – Other Programs of Note

Polis Solutions has developed an experiential leadership course for community and police leaders, which was successfully piloted in Fayetteville, NC with funding from BJA NTTAC. Based on the same foundation of social science research and core principles as Polis' **T3 – Tact, Tactics, and Trust™** police training system, the **Community and Department Leaders** course brought together a fifteen predominantly African-American community leaders from a host of diverse organizations and fifteen Fayetteville Police Department leaders from the rank of sergeant to chief. Like the LDP+ program described above, the Polis course focuses on experiential training that fosters the collaborative identification of common ground on urgent issues of shared concern followed by development and completion of a collaborative action plan.

Although the Polis pilot class was only a single day long, it nonetheless generated a 20% increase in community leaders' trust in their police department as measured by pre- and post-training anonymous surveys. Attendees also reported 100% high satisfaction with the course, with the only criticism being that it should have been longer. Another innovative element of the Polis class is the use of informal, street-level conversations with residents of distressed neighborhoods to gather background information and to gauge community sentiment prior to the actual training. The results of the Polis Community and Department Leaders course were presented to Attorney General Lynch during her visit to Fayetteville as part of her national model community policing agencies tour in May 2016.

To no coincidence, one of the community leaders who participated in the Fayetteville Polis pilot class was the owner of a local chain of barbershops. His presence offers an anecdotal illustration of the wider potential role of barbershops as a key locus of community leadership and empowerment in African-American neighborhoods. For example, Kong's (1997) study of community-based hypertension control programs is grounded in the premise that chronic public health issues of poor African-American communities such as hypertension cannot be sufficiently addressed through customary, mainstream solutions, which are largely grounded in the experiences and far better healthcare resources of predominantly white, middle-class communities. Kong considers how "churches, barbershops, beauty salons, firehouses, housing projects, and worksites can play a valuable role in increasing the number of African-American hypertensives who receive treatment" (409). In order to fully leverage these informal resources, doctors must be willing to act as consultants of "lay volunteers," who are by some accounts also "community leaders" (411). In other words, the establishment must bend to the norms of the community and not the other way around.

We also note a new related study by Moore, *et al*. (2016) showing that despite the widespread acceptance of the "barbershop" model, in which barbers in predominantly poor African- American communities are trained to serve as informal community health workers, survey data collected by the authors indicates first, that customers would rather get heath advice from a formal clinician or a church leader rather than a barber, and second, that barbers generally feel that without additional training they cannot effectively influence the health decision of their customers. The results of this study suggest that programs intended to address chronic neighborhood issues through relatively informal

means must be preceded by an investigation of the needs and wants of the community and an evidenced-based assessment of the capabilities of informal service providers. Moore, *et al.* suggest that the barbershop model may have been enthusiastically adopted in many areas due to faulty assumptions about why older African-American men avoid doctors – it may not be cultural but rather due to economic constraints.

Despite this cautionary assessment, developing the latent leadership capacity of respected community members seems to offer a promising avenue that merits continued exploration. We note, for example, innovative recent efforts such as "Barbershop Books," a program that "leverages the cultural significance of barbershops in Black communities to help black boys identify as readers," and "Shape-Up: Barbers Building Better Brothers," a Philadelphia-based effort to leverage barbers' influence to reduce HIV transmission and retaliatory violence, two leading causes of death among young African-American men.[4]

Last but not least, we want to highlight the success of the **Clemente Course in the Humanities**, which originally started on New York's Lower East Side. The Clemente Course aims at providing exposure to critical thinking skills and heightening general intellectual awareness in a context that fosters deeper community engagement (Rosi, 2011). The course runs for a year, and teaches the humanities at an introductory college level to people living in economic distress. Delivered in collaboration with volunteer faculty from colleges and universities on five continents. Students learn through dialogue about topics such as ethics, philosophy, literature, critical thinking, and writing. While the Clemente Course is not a leadership class per se, it effectively fosters

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[4] See https://barbershopbooks.org.

critical thinking and other skills essential for leaders.

The Course has been held at numerous sites in the U.S., Canada, and overseas, and has had a total of 10,000 program attendees, of whom over 50% have successfully graduated. The Clemente Course was awarded a National Humanities Medal by the White House in 2014. A longitudinal, multi-site evaluation (2006 - 2011) by Rosi (2011) showed significant short, mid, and long-term positive effects for graduates of the program at several sites in Massachusetts. Program serves a useful bridge to wider leadership roles, stable employment, and continued higher education. Program sites also provide childcare, transportation/meal vouchers, ESL support, and writing skills tutoring.

Section 4.0 – Key Gaps

As the preceding analysis in Section 3.0 demonstrates, there are a number of innovative,

evidence-based leadership development programs that have generated noteworthy results

across a diverse range of practical social contexts, some of them very challenging. We

reiterate here the strong potential that some of these programs may have in addressing the

leadership gap in distressed neighborhoods. Notwithstanding our favorable assessment

that programs such as Cure Violence, USAID-funded leadership development efforts, and

several other efforts described above appear to provide frameworks suitable for wider

application, our analysis of existing programs reveals at least **four critical gaps** in

available remedies for improving leadership in distressed neighborhoods. These gaps are

as follows:

1. **Length and Sustainability:** There is a significant gap in leadership development programs that are long enough, detailed enough, and sufficiently sustainable both financially and organizationally to make a lasting, significant impact in the distressed communities where needs are most acute.
2. **Lack of Evidence:** There is a significant gap in rigorous, independent evaluation data regarding the efficacy of leadership development programs in distressed neighborhoods. While many of the programs that we identified have undergone various degrees and kinds of evaluation, many of these evaluations have not been carried out with sufficient depth and methodological rigor to justify large investments.
3. **Lack of Programs Specific to Public Safety:** There is a troubling gap in leadership development programs specific to the context public safety and community-based crime prevention. Most of the programs we identified were created in sectors other than public safety. We attribute this dearth of programs to several factors, but a weak trust is foremost among them.
4. **Lack of Trust-Building Efforts:** Finally and most significantly, there is a wide gap in trust-building efforts aimed at improving the legitimacy and credibility of the police and other criminal justice organizations in the eyes, hearts, and minds of the residents of the nation's most distressed neighborhoods. Plainly stated, trust is a non-negotiable prerequisite for any leadership development effort that aspires to be effective.

We elaborate on each of these four gaps in the remainder of this section.

Section 4.1 – Length and Sustainability

Many of the programs that we reviewed are fundamentally limited by the short duration of the initial leadership development training itself, and by the lack of substantive follow-up support for community members who have completed training. As we mentioned several times above, there are consistent findings (*e.g.* Scheffert 2007 and Keating 2011) suggesting a significant correlation between length of training and its effects. The available data show that longer programs tend to improve participants' learning and performance outcomes. It is also clear that sustained involvement in actual project-based work also has positive effects on learning.

With few exceptions, however, the majority of leadership development programs that we identified provide less than 40 total hours of actual training time. Examples of notable exceptions include Cure Violence training (48 hours + two-hour monthly sessions), the University of Minnesota's U-Lead Program, which runs for eighteen months, and LDP+ (five – eight months of team workshops). It is also clear that project-based programs such as LDP+ that focus on actual implementation of substantive community reform and development efforts have a more lasting impact on learners' skill growth. While longer, more intensive programs may require greater resources to conduct and sustain, it is generally the case that such efforts will generate better results commensurate with such a larger outlay.

The problem with many short-term programs is that they tend to give a small, transient dose of training to people who may, in the end, not be the best positioned ones to impact community-level conditions. Here it is worth considering Kenneth Pigg's study (1999) on the dynamics of leadership emergence. Traditional models have focused

on inculcating potential leaders with enhanced skills in areas such as public speaking, ethical decision-making, and role modeling. However, these models typically assume with little or no evidentiary basis which people will make the best leaders, and where and how they ought to lead.

Pigg upends this traditional leadership paradigm, demonstrating that effective community leadership is grounded in the contextualized ability to optimize a complex network of relationships and interactions, not in the general possession of a certain stock of personal talent, will, or skill (189-200). As Pigg sees it, community leadership education should therefore focus less on forging people in the mold of "mythical leaders," and more on training them how best to leverage and coordinate the reserves of talent, skill, and will already present in their community. Pigg argues that community leaders "rely on networks and influence, with relationships developed through extensive interactions with community residents usually representing many different points of view or interests" (196). Such a position aligns closely with the framework of civic capacity that we have emphasized throughout this report.

Section 4.2 – Lack of Evidence

The evaluation of leadership development programs would ideally be grounded in a thorough and rigorous consideration of the four well-established levels of training impact identified by Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick (2006): reaction, learning, behavior, and results. Reaction refers to participants' subjective assessment of the training experience. While reaction is an important measure of impact, it cannot assess actual learning, which must be separately measured against objectives and benchmarks grounded in specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs). Behavior, in turn, measures the extent to which

growth in KSAs is manifest in substantive performance. The final level of impact is results, which considers the wider effects of training with a wider social or organizational ecology.

As matters stand, however, the evaluation of leadership development programs is too often bottomed on fairly superficial processes that do not capture Kirkpatrick's four levels of impact or anything else that approximates them. In a Kellogg Foundation review of fifty-five different leadership programs conducted by Reinelt, *et al*. (2002), findings revealed a large gap in rigorous data on outcomes and effectiveness (6). The review selected programs, which (among other criteria) focus on civic/community leadership and positive social change, have a minimum participation time of three months, include innovative evaluation practices, and target youth and other groups historically excluded from leadership roles (Reinelt, *et al*. 2002:29).

The report goes on to note the absence of explicit theories of change that articulate a substantive link between program activities and desired outcomes and impacts. To the extent that programs are evaluated, the overwhelming emphasis tends to be on capturing near-term outcomes, which all things being equal are simpler and less costly to assess. In addition, insufficient attention has been paid to assessing the relation between changes in individual performance and wider organizational impacts. With respect to the latter point in particular, the Kellogg report recommends closer alignment between organizational objectives and program activities, which tend to focus on building individuals' leadership capacity.

Although it is relatively easy to evaluate changes in knowledge, skills, and attitudes (KSAs) immediately following training, it is much more challenging to assess

changes in actual behavior, particular on a longitudinal basis (2002:7). It should also be noted that assessment of changes in KSAs over-relies on participants' self-evaluations, which tend to be notoriously inaccurate when they are not benchmarked against other external performance criteria (23).

Beyond the specific assessment of training impact along the lines identified by Kirkpatrick, the evaluation of leadership development efforts raises a host of wider issues that are carefully examined by Rosenbaum and Schuck (2012). Rosenbaum and Schuck use "Comprehensive Community Partnerships" (CCPs) as an umbrella term to describe the myriad of programs aimed at addressing the combined individual, family, and neighborhood risk factors that influence rates of violent crime. "Comprehensive" encapsulates the assumption that risk factors are fundamentally interrelated and irreducible to any single cause. "Community" refers to the "fundamental notion that crime rates at the community level are controlled more by neighborhood context and informal social control processes than by formal social control mechanisms" (226). "Partnerships" refers not only to the coordinated efforts of multiple agencies, but also to the coordinated efforts between the community itself and these agencies.

CCPs as Rosenbaum and Schuck define them are those programs that seek to leverage or develop community leadership on behalf of public safety goals. Rosenbaum and Schuck go on to review a multitude of programs that fit within the umbrella of comprehensive community partnerships, most of which have also been addressed in the present report. Rosenbaum and Schuck argue that successful collaborative community initiatives need to take inclusivity and empowerment seriously, and caution that an anemic commitment to these principles has sunk many programs and besmirched the

credibility of comprehensive community partnerships in general (240). Whenever possible, CCP's should hold themselves to evidence based practices; institute a steering committee; establish a common mission that unifies all participating stakeholders (240). In order to avoid the common pitfalls of evaluation, Rosenbaum and Schuck suggest that "clear logic models should be articulated and tested to identify causal mechanisms and pathways" (241).

Section 4.3 – Lack of Programs Specific to Public Safety

Plainly stated, there are very few leadership development programs specific to the context of public safety and community-based crime prevention. We attribute this dearth of programs to several factors, but weak trust and deep mutual suspicion between communities and criminal justice stakeholders is foremost among them. While programs such as SafeStreets™ and Cure Violence involve elements of leadership development, such training is not their core mission. Most of the programs we identified were created in sectors other than public safety. We also note that widespread and often successful programs such as citizens academies and neighborhood crime watch training may improve community members' ability to cooperate with and assist police, or at least to better understand the complexities of their mission, but should not be confused with leadership development efforts fundamentally oriented toward objectives of equal partnerships and enhanced civic capacity.

Section 4.4 – Lack of Trust-Building Efforts

The trust-building gap is perhaps the most serious of all, and holds the key to the success of all other programmatic efforts. Compared to efforts in domains such as public health and education, criminal justice-oriented leadership programs face an uphill battle when it

comes to earning the trust of skeptical and cynical residents of distressed neighborhoods.

As Skogan (2008:31) puts it:

> Nothing in the past has prepared the public [in disadvantaged neighborhoods] for new approaches to policing, and they are unlikely to understand the goals or tactics associated with new modes of policing. When they do hear about it, there may be no reason for residents to believe it. In poor neighborhoods the past is too often strewn with broken promises. Residents are accustomed to seeing programs come and go in response to political and budgetary cycles that are out of their control, and they can rightly be skeptical that community policing or any other promised reform will be any different.

Skogan (2008:32) goes on to argue that even when residents of distressed neighborhoods

can be successfully enlisted as stakeholders, they will need substantive education on

community policing and its core collaborative practices:

> [c]ivilians will not know what they can newly expect from the police, nor what they themselves can contribute to solving neighborhood problems. Like police themselves, uninformed citizens are likely to define their expectations of policing in traditional terms, expecting more patrols, fast response times, and arrests to solve their problems for them. It will be their instinct to demand more of the same in response to almost every issue.

Skogan also identifies the crucial issue of fear of retaliation or retribution for

participating in criminal justice reform efforts. Even where neighborhood leaders are

genuinely interested in joining collaborative reform efforts, their basic physical safety

may be at risk if they are perceived in the community as "snitches," "rats," or "sell-outs."

Criminal justice stakeholders much demonstrate real empathy in appreciating the

depth of this concern, and be prepared to offers substantive means of addressing it.

Beside taking appropriate operational measures to ensure the immediate and long-term

security of community leaders that are beyond the scope of this report to enumerate,

leadership development efforts should be broad-based enough to avoid the appearance or

misperception that they are merely a subterfuge for creating a "fifth column" beholden to

the criminal justice system. Among the ways to accomplish this is the creation of

leadership-building coalitions comprising a wider range of government and community

interests beyond criminal justice.

Section 5.0 – Conclusion and Recommendations

As we have sought to make clear in the first four sections of this report, the challenge of providing effective leadership development in distressed communities is both longstanding and complex, yet it is far from insurmountable. By framing the challenge of leadership development in relation to the foundational goal of enhancing civic capacity, it becomes more apparent that strong neighborhood-level leadership plays a decisive role in nearly every facet of community stability, safety, and health.

To remind the reader, we defined civic capacity at the beginning of this report as ***the ability to collaboratively co-create positive social conditions in a manner that respects diversity and difference while enhancing community trust and safety.*** By now, it should be clear that effective neighborhood leaders are characterized by their exceptional ability to play an active, constructive role in the process of building civic capacity. Conversely, we have also tried to explain that weak civic capacity both stems in part from weak leadership, and also reciprocally perpetuates the very social conditions that militate against the *sui generis* development of strong local leadership. Therefore, a holistic approach to crafting policies responsive to this twofold challenge must take account of the need to mitigate underlying causes of distress, while also addressing the immediate need for more effective ground-level leadership. To elaborate further on this point, and to provide a catalyst for further dialogue on how best to address the challenge of leadership development in distressed neighborhoods, we offer the list of recommendations that follows below. To be sure, this list is far from exhaustive; however, we hope it provides a solid starting point.

5.1 – Engage both traditional and non-traditional community stakeholders and leaders. Ensure that diverse and especially diverging or even conflicting community groups are substantively engaged. Remember that a shared race, ethnicity, or other element of identity does not necessarily translate into shared values, opinions, and beliefs on controversial social issues.

5.2 – Be proactive in answering neighborhoods' legitimate self-interest and desire for equal partnerships. When stakeholders ask out of curiosity, skepticism, or both, "what's in it for me," be prepared with compelling and honest answers.

5.3 – Address issues of safety and security related to community participation. Residents of distressed neighborhoods may have serious and legitimate concerns about their personal safety if some members of the community perceive them as cooperating with authorities. In an environment of widespread mistrust, simple attendance at police-sponsored meetings can be seen as "snitching" or "selling out."

5.4 – Develop leadership programs specifically aimed at channeling demonstrated skills of people with historical direct and indirect ties to gun violence and other illegal networks. Expand and refine the existing Cure Violence model to enable additional opportunities for leveraging the influence of informal leaders over gangs members, youth in crisis, and other at-risk community members. Integrate focused deterrence, procedural justice, and leadership initiatives.

5.5 – Engage existing pools of potential community leaders such as military veterans. Following the model of Safe Passage, identify potential informal community leaders who may have an interest in public service and may also be seeking to stabilize their own life circumstances via stable employment, affordable house, and so forth.

5.6 – Explore possibilities for leveraging AmericCorps-VISTA, BJA VIPS, and other similar programs to create sustainable leadership development platforms. Create evidence-based pilot programs that build on the USAID initiatives described above to undertake sustained leadership development efforts nested in specific local projects.

5.7 – Programs must truly develop leadership, not merely teach community members about police work. Equal partnership means creating and empowering local leadership. Community trust cannot be earned if community leaders merely see themselves as auxiliary "eyes and ears" of the police department, or as minor actors in problem-solving initiatives that are ultimately driven by outside interests and agendas.

5.8 – Develop sustainable, evidence-based, focused, mid/long-range efforts in high-impact communities rather than diffuse, "one and done" trainings. As the evidence in this report suggests, scare dollars are likely to be better spent on carefully designed, specifically focused, and rigorously evaluated programs that seek lasting changes in neighborhood leadership rather than transient effects that may have momentary public relations value, but little of substance beyond that.

5.9 – Explore avenues for integrating focused deterrence, leadership development, and procedural justice initiatives in distressed neighborhoods. Move beyond a silo model and seek opportunities for synergistic responses that expand and refine existing and near-future DOJ procedural justice, focused deterrence, and related initiatives. VRN cities may offer an opportune test-bed.

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Annotated Bibliography

Please note: sources marked with an asterisk are supplemental only and have not been annotated.

"Building Capacity and Developing Leadership to Foster Self Sufficiency." *The Democracy Collaborative*, **accessed September 27, 2016.** http://community-wealth.org/policy-brief/Building-Capacity-and-Developing-Leadership-to-Foster-Self-Sufficiency. This report describes how anchor institutions, particularly institutions of higher education, are particularly well situated to contribute to neighborhood leadership capacity. Summarizes assistance efforts at Emory's Office of University and Community Partnerships (OUCP) and at the University of Illinois at Chicago's Neighborhoods Initiative (UICNI). UICNI includes a Latino leadership development program (Latino Urban Leaders), a community health initiative program (Chicago Partnership for Health Promotion) and Illinois Resource Net, a nonprofit capacity building program".

"Expanding Opportunities in America's Urban Areas." Poverty to Prosperity Program and the CAP Economic Policy Team, March 23, (2015). https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/report/2015/03/23/109460/expanding-opportunities-in-americas-urban-areas/. Government agencies such as HUD propose "to build on existing place-based efforts such as the Promise Zones initiative and to partner with cities to help them prepare for anticipated growth, address the impacts of climate change, and help families succeed" (2). Also, place-conscious initiatives, which draw upon resources outside of neighborhood boundaries, are being utilized. Examples include "Partners for a Competitive Workforce—a cross-sector partnership in the Ohio, Kentucky, and Indiana tristate region— which aligns public and nonprofit employment resources with employer needs". The report makes suggestion as to how these place-based and place-conscious efforts could be more effective by examining challenges that remain overlooked.

*Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015. http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf

*Leadership Development Program Plus: A Guide for Facilitators (Revised Edition). Medford, MA: Management Sciences for Health, 2014. https://www.msh.org/resources/leadership-development-program-plus-ldp-a-guide-for-facilitators

*President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing Implementation Guide: Moving from Recommendations to Action. Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015.
http://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/Implementation_Guide.pdf

 The State of the Nation's Housing 2015. Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, 2015.
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/research/state_nations_housing. The authors find that despite strong recovery trends, the worst consequences of the 2008 crash persist in low-income minority neighborhoods (35). Many renters face significant "cost-burdens" in which monthly rent exceeds 30% of income – this means that these renters live under precarious housing conditions which can make a potentially short term income crisis, such as medical issue, turn into a housing-loss scenario. "Much to their detriment, cost-burdened households are forced to cut back on food, healthcare, and other critical expenses". Though affordable housing programs alleviate this vulnerability, "assistance lags far behind need".

Adams, Tom, Seth Borges, Cheryl Casciani, Sarah Gould, George Knight, Terri Langston, Jeff Malachowsky, Regina McGraw, Rinku Sen. Grassroots Leadership Development: A Guide for Grassroots Leaders, Support organizations, and Funders. WK Kellogg Foundation, 2001. Adams et al distinguish between "grassroots" leadership and traditional "positional" leaders. Among the many differences identified, one stand out: grassroots leadership is not motivated by the maintenance of status or privilege and thus can be more truly motivated by a vision of community-wide benefit. Programs to develop grassroots leaders must distinguish leadership identification and leadership development. Programs can do both but must be clear about what strategies are intended to teach skills to emerging leaders and which strategies are intended to identify best candidates for training/engagement. Two grassroots led organizations, People United for a Better Oakland (PUEBLO) and Korean Immigrant Workers Association (KIWA), are discussed in later sections as examples of successful community organizing efforts.

Aiyer, Sophie M., Marc A. Zimmerman, Susan Morrel-Samuels, and Thomas M. Reischl. "From Broken Windows to Busy Streets: a Community Empowerment Perspective." Health Education & Behavior 42, no. 2 (2015): 137-147. The authors offer "busy streets" as an alternative conceptual framework to Social Disorganization Theory and the "broken windows" theory. They argue that "busy streets create a positive social context where social cohesion, trust, social capital, and collective efficacy thrive" (137). Therefore, an approach to crime reduction can involve engendering "busy streets" rather than cracking down on "broken windows". The advantage to such an approach is that it works to empower communities so that they can institute informal social control.

Akers, Timothy A., Roberto H. Potter, and Carl V. Hill. *Epidemiological Criminology: A Public Health Approach to Crime and Violence.* **John Wiley & Sons, 2012.** Akers et al make a compelling case for an interdisciplinary approach to criminology that takes advantage of recent progress in the fields of public health and criminal justice. They offer a definition of epidemiological criminology as the "epistemological and etiological integration of the theories, methods, practices, and technologies used in public health and criminal justice that incorporates the broader interdisciplinary framework of epidemiology and criminology (xiii). The authors contend that the risks that underlie criminal behavior patterns also underlie health risks – addressing this single set of risks both improves health and reduces criminal behavior. They propose that various behaviors, ranging from high-school dropout to drug use to burglary, constitute a 'health-crime nexus' (p. xiv). Furthermore, they assert that this nexus is informed not only by environmental factors but also individual free will – thus they offer a neo-classical take on criminality that balances choices with determinism. Poor health choices are there for associated with criminal behavior and vice versa. The implications of their argument involve a comprehensive approach to crime that addresses public health concerns in addition to traditional law-enforcement.

Alinsky, Saul. Rules for Radicals. Vintage, 2010. Alinsky's "rules" are practical, common-sense strategies and perspectives for long-term social organizing applicable to just about any cause. Alinsky argues first and foremost that justice, however it is defined, cannot be achieved through rigid dogma or an uncompromising rejection of "the system" (4, 11, 79). Rather, activists and organizers must face the hard reality of choosing between their stated goals or maintaining their romantically rebellious yet politically marginalized self-image. In order to do this, organizers must understand that power is perceived and never fully possessed - "power is not only what you have, but what the enemy thinks you have" (127). Organizers ought to embrace language and appearance that shows "the other side" that they are powerful and worthy of engagement rather than "right." Beyond this, Alinsky maintains that organizers ought to use tactics that are enjoyable (139), switch up their tactics often (159), keep up constant pressure for change (129), allow "the enemy" to escalate and engage in behavior that will sour the public to their position (129), and focus rhetorical attacks on individuals rather than institutions in recognition that the individuals who staff institutions will change the institutions from the inside if they perceive that it is worth doing so to avoid shame and ridicule (133). Alinsky points out that any organization is bound by rules of its own design, and that this is often their greatest weakness. "Make the enemy live up to its own book of rules," Alinsky argues, and watch their moral authority disintegrate when they are unable to do so (152).

American Academy of Pediatrics. "Adverse childhood experiences and the lifelong consequences of trauma." (2014). Accessed at https://www.aap.org/en-us/Documents/ttb_aces_consequences.pdf

Anglin, Roland, and United States. Department of Housing Urban Development. Office of Policy Development Research. Building the Organizations That Build Communities: Strengthening the Capacity of Faith- and Community-based Development Organizations. Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, 2004. Examines the capacity of faith-based and community organizations (primarily community development corporations) to foster development in poor communities. The various authors emphasize the issue of "capacity" and attempt to clarify the research gaps facing faith-based and community development organizations. Among the conclusions are that "local and regional intermediaries complement their national counterparts" by "establishing gap funding to help CDCs piece together the separate federal, state, local, and private funds and tax advantages for community development projects" (66). Furthermore, "these intermediaries help grassroots groups overcome their problems of limited reach and immature organizational and administrative prowess" (87) and that "national and local intermediaries helped promote capacity building in cities where they were active" (123). Overall, the report finds that "the faith sector is valuable to community renewal in the United States" (152) and that "the growth of CDCs as a set of activities devoted to improving quality of life in neighborhoods and communities has depended in significant part on the field's ability to build capacity among community development institutions" (265).

Auspos, Patricia, Prudence Brown, and Stacey A. Sutton. "Living Cities and Civic Capacity: Leadership, Leverage, and Legitimacy." (2008). The authors define civic capacity "as the ability of the key actors (foundations, intermediaries, and CDCs) in the community development system to influence or shape policy, practice, and resources in ways that allow them to increase the scale, scope, and effectiveness of their activities" (iii). The authors evaluate how Living Cities, "a consortium of financial organizations, private foundations, and public sector organizations," has fared in terms of building the civic capacity of the distressed neighborhoods it operates within. The authors find that "overall, Living Cities investments have helped to build local community development systems that are resilient enough to adapt to changes in the macro environment and take on a broader scope of work" (iv). This evaluation hinges upon distinguishing civic capacity from social capital: "social capital largely concerns private ties, relationships, and interactions, while civic capacity encompasses issues of public concern and the use of public resources" (1). Much of the focus of the report is on how the primary intermediaries of Living Cities, LISC, and Enterprise, can broaden their efficacy beyond affordable housing through the development of civic capacity among CDCs. The authors argue that Living Cities "will need to get city agencies, anchor institutions, and other key players to work together differently, repackage money, and respond more flexibly to neighborhood needs" (6). This means confronting the "precarious balance" between "efforts to build trust within neighborhoods and establish legitimacy among outside

powerbrokers and developers" (19). The authors argue that "[t]his requires: fostering the emergence of neighborhood leaders; intensive outreach; organizing local constituencies around the vision and specific implementation activities; staying finely attuned to local needs and dynamics; and reporting back regularly" (20). Accountability of intermediaries to outside powerbrokers is built into the relationship, whereas intermediaries must be intentional and deliberate in forging trust between themselves and the community itself.

Avolio, Bruce J, Fred O Walumbwa, and Todd J Weber. "Leadership: Current Theories, Research, and Future Directions." Annual Review of Psychology 60, (2009): 421-49. This article discusses several models of leadership: shared, collective, and distributed leadership models. These models entail "reciprocal influence," meaning that "team members collectively lead each other," directing projects when their expertise or specialty seems most crucial and quickly reverting to following when other's skills appear more relevant (431). The models lends themselves most readily to cross-cultural leadership, in which a group constituted of diverse persons with differing perspectives can coordinate their behavior in pursuit of a common goal (438). Cross-cultural leadership shares and distributes decision making authority to leverage the full breadth of knowledge available to a diverse team.

Ayon, Cecilia, and Lee, Cheryl D. "Building Strong Communities: An Evaluation of a Neighborhood Leadership Program in a Diverse Urban Area." Journal of Community Psychology 37, no. 8 (2009): 975-86. Ayon et al indicate that the grassroots Neighborhood Leadership Program (NLP) based in Long Beach, CA is generally effective in increasing the leadership skills of participants and sustaining their civic involvement despite the relatively high-risk urban environment in which they live. A majority of the participants were Latino (76%) and female (67%) (981). The program seeks to enhance confidence and social skills.

Barton, William H., Marie Watkins, and Roger Jarjoura. "Youths and Communities: Toward Comprehensive Strategies for Youth Development." Social Work 42, no. 5 (1997): 483-93. The authors discuss the efficacy of CCIs (Comprehensive Community Initiatives) in addressing problems of young people, such as teenage pregnancy, school dropout, substance abuse, juvenile delinquency, and violence (483). The authors argue that narrowly targeted programs that address single issues are less effective than programs that inculcate broadly protective factors, which counter overlapping risks encountered at the intersection of problematic behaviors, such as drug use and sex. The accrual of these protective factors is part of successful youth development, which the authors claim involves "safety and structure, belonging and membership, self-worth and an ability to contribute, independence and control over one's life, closeness and several good relationships, competence and mastery" (487). The authors examine several CCIs that demonstrate efficacy at contributing to successful youth development and the accrual of protective factors, including the Children, Youth,

and Families Initiative in Chicago, and New Futures, founded by the Annie E. Casey Foundation. The authors call for "a framework for developing a comprehensive community approach to promote healthy youth development". Cultivating leadership among youth is also implied to be dependent upon successful, holistic youth development.

Bieler, Sam, Kilolo Kijakazi, Nancy La Vigne, Nina Vinik, and Spencer Overton. "Engaging Communities in Reducing Gun Violence." The Urban Institute, 2016. This text makes a series of suggestion for engaging communities in the reduction of gun violence, including the incorporation of procedural justice, enhanced community outreach efforts, and implicit bias mitigation into police operation enforcement operations.

Blum, Robert W. "Distressed Communities as a Breeding Ground for Noncommunicable Conditions." Journal of Adolescent Health 55, no. 6 (2014): S4-S5. This short article discusses the WAVE (Well-Being of Adolescents in Vulnerable Environments) study, a cross-national examination of the impacts social context has on the health of young people. Among the sites of study was Baltimore, MD, where drug use, violence, and intimate partner violence are "endemic" and highly associated with the social context of concentrated urban poverty. One aspect of the social context contributing to the pathological conditions of Baltimore's distressed communities is a "lack of engagement and supports for youth." This theme is recurrent cross-nationally– young people in distressed communities live in a social context of neglect, even in comparatively wealthy nations. Blum contends that "neighborhoods are powerful socializing influences" that can become "toxic environments [which] breed behaviors and threats that compromise adolescent health and well-being in the short-term and predispose residents to adult NCDs and mortality across time".

Briggs, Xavier De Souza. Democracy as Problem Solving: Civic Capacity in Communities across the Globe. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2008. Briggs distinguishes between governance, the "the set of norms, institutions and practices for managing collective life," and government, "the official apparatus . . . for acting on public concerns" (33). An example of "governance" is civic participation, while an example of government is a police department. Government alone – local policing for instance – cannot be expected to address complex, on-going social problems without concurrent changes in governance. Changes in governance are wrought through coordinating communities with public institutions – the traditional approach to this has been civic associations. However, Briggs argues that public problems are increasingly complex; new forms of community organizing need to be built that are attuned to the specific nature of place-based challenges (8). Traditional civic associations are not equipped to be as flexible yet focused and interconnected as today's "wicked problems" require. Likewise, calls for "improved leadership" and "public-private partnerships" are

often only platitudes that validate government while maintaining inadequate governance. In order to align the force of governance with the power of government, communities must achieve a threshold of *civic capacity,* the extent to which [the sectors of a community] are 1) *capable* of collective action on public concerns and 2) *choose* to apply such capability" i.e "the way and the will" (13). When communities manage to solve problems, Briggs argues, they do so because actors and groups with diverse interests share enough in common (the problem itself) to strategize and implement actions that involve a degree of deliberation (deliberate democracy) attenuated with regular negotiation (argumentative democracy) (119, 195). Organizations that exclude decisive democracy in favor of deliberation become mired in endless defining of the problem while those that exclude deliberation never fully understand the problem. Civic capacity, explains Briggs, is "shorthand for the ingredients that can make the machinery of governance effective. . . .(12)"

Brune, and Bossert. "Building Social Capital in Post-conflict Communities: Evidence from Nicaragua." Social Science & Medicine 68, no. 5 (2009): 885-93.
Social capital can be split in two categories: cognitive/attitudinal and structural/behavioral. Cognitive/attitudinal social capital is indicated by trust and solidarity, social harmony and sociability, while structural/behavioral refers to "participation in groups, community and civic activities, as well as, social networks, roles and norms" (886). This study evaluates a systematic effort to increase cognitive/attitudinal social capital in areas of Nicaragua that remain socially fragmented due to the legacy of the 1981-1989 Civil War. Conditions of the Nicaraguan treatment areas are generally analogous to conditions found in high-poverty urban neighborhoods of the US, in that both groups of communities are characterized by fierce kinship loyalties and general mistrust of anyone outside of that kinship circle. For example, only 26.3% of respondent to a base-line survey "felt they could trust people in their neighborhood" (888). Such low-trust is associated with increased violence, predation, and gang activity. The USAID funded project identified and implemented several strategies to combat this low-trust: 1) build on existing organizations in the community rather than impose new organizations 2) develop participation mechanisms that encourage increased and continuing attendance at meetings and encourage broad participation in project activities 3) develop communication, consensus building and conflict resolution skills both in the community organization and within the wider community to build higher levels of trust within the community 4) encourage decision making and empowerment of community members especially those who have not participated previously 5) create enduring ties of support with organizations outside the community. Moreover, the program implemented "leadership training workshops for leaders of the community, teachers, and others in content areas of moral values, leadership, strategic planning, budgeting, and conflict resolution training" (887). Analysis shows that trust and civic engagement were improved.

Brunson, Rod K. "Focused Deterrence and Improved Police–Community Relations." Criminology & Public Policy 14, no. 3 (2015): 507-14. The author discusses how focused deterrence models, which target high-risk individuals and groups, can improve community-police relations, whereas suppressive deterrence models such as "stop and frisk" injure the image of police and degrade their long-term efficacy (507). Trusted community leaders can play a role in focused deterrence. For example, they can serve as a sort of witness/testifier in procedurally just offender notifications meetings, where suspects are confronted by the community and urged to avoid violence and curtail criminal behavior (509). Brunson distinguishes between "moral" and "legal" authority, suggesting that police may have the latter and not the former in high-poverty, high-crime minority neighborhoods. Community leaders, *and only community leaders*, may inject proceedings with the moral authority necessary for their effectiveness. If Brunson is correct, then focused deterrence models must take serious measures to incorporate community leaders.

Chaskin, Robert. "Building Community Capacity: A Definitional Framework and Case Studies from a Comprehensive Community Initiative." Urban Affairs Review 36, no. 3 (2001): 291-323. Community capacity is "the interaction of human capital, organizational resources, and social capital existing within a given community that can be leveraged to solve collective problems and improve the well-being of that community" (7). Chaskin argues that community capacity is generated through four mutually constituting strategies: leadership development, organizational development, community organizing, and building collaborations, partnerships, and networks (11). The degree to which each strategy must be emphasized depends on the community being addressed (13). Although tensions develop as these strategies begin to take effect, Chaskin argues that community capacity is only achieved through a comprehensive approach (15, see also 35, 67, 88). In support of this argument, Chaskin discusses three comprehensive community building initiatives (CCBIs) and how each succeeded through adapting a comprehensive strategy to the conditions encountered at the street level. Successful CCBIs instituted a broker organization that "specifically engaged in mediating, promoting, and nurturing instrumental relationships among organizations in a community, or between them and organizations outside the community" (126). For example, broker organizations diffuse the tensions between organization intending to develop leadership capacity through coaching and those intending to offer community leaders technical assistance. The most useful contribution this work makes to the study of civic-capacity is its emphasis on "brokering" at the inter-organizational level. Since the problems of distressed communities are complex and mutually-agonizing, the solutions must be comprehensive; this requires several organizations to coordinate their efforts simultaneously. "More cooks in the kitchen" means more opportunities for friction, and thus successful CCBI's have an internal referee.

Christens, Brian D., and Dolan, Tom. "Interweaving Youth Development, Community Development, and Social Change through Youth Organizing." Youth & Society 43, no. 2 (2011): 528-48. This study focuses on a youth organizing initiative conducted through Inland Congregations United for Change (ICUC). ICUC works through faith-based intermediaries in San Bernardino and Riverside Counties in California, and is an affiliate of the umbrella organization People Improving Communities through Organizing (PICO), a faith-based national coordinator of community organizers. ICUC seeks redistribution of state resources from crime suppression to infrastructure i.e. parks, libraries, school cafeterias and bathrooms. Through interviews and document analysis, the authors assessed ICUC's community level impact: "news articles substantiate youth organizers' accounts of how they pushed schools to implement new antiviolence programs and got the city to establish paid summer internship programs for youth" (534). Interviews found that ICUC was perceived as substantially altering relationships between youth and adults, and across cultures and faiths, which can be interpreted as a contribution to collective efficacy and community wide civic capacity (536-538). Finally, the authors found that participants in ICUC programs experienced psychological empowerment, leadership development, and sociopolitical development (539-541).

Cicchetti, Murray-Close, Leff, Baker, Waasdorp, Vaughn, Bevans, Thomas, Guerra, Hausman, and Monopoli. "Social Cognitions, Distress, and Leadership Self-efficacy: Associations with Aggression for High-risk Minority Youth." 26, no. 3 (2014): 759-72. This study argues that "in order for aggression programs to be most effective, they should emphasize the promotion of community involvement and leadership" (761). Community involvement and leadership skills are negatively correlated with a belief that violence is an effective way to solve disputes, thus programs that engender such pro-social skills reduce violent behavior (769). However, the authors find that aggression programs rarely emphasize community involvement and leadership. This means that such programs are less effective in distressed minority neighborhoods where community involvement and leadership is at a deficit compared to suburban white neighborhoods. "Many aggression intervention programs that have been designed with suburban nonethnic minority youth in mind have been used or slightly adapted in order to try and meet the needs of high-risk urban youth" (759). The results have been disappointing and this study clarifies why the programs may have been ineffective – high-risk urban youth need prosocial alternatives to violence and not another lesson about why violence should be avoided.

Collins, Charles, Neal, Jennifer, and Neal, Zachary. "Transforming Individual Civic Engagement into Community Collective Efficacy: The Role of Bonding Social Capital." American Journal of Community Psychology 54, no. 3 (2014): 328-36. This text provides a primarily descriptive analysis of "Neighborhood University," the

community-building element of the Family Network Partnership (FNP). FNP is a delinquency-prevention program housed in the School of Social Work at the University of Southern Mississippi. Neighborhood University is designed to connect low-income, predominantly African-American neighborhood residents with the resource-rich university community. Distinct centers for recreation, the arts, academics, technology, health, nutrition, business and civic engagement unite youth, families, students and faculty (1). Collins, et al. find that "troubled youth engaged with the family support and/or community building dimensions of FNP penetrate the juvenile justice system at exceptionally low rates (less than 10% recidivism of first-time offenders)" (7). NU is an example of how an anchor institution may approach the goal of community building by acting as an intermediary between residents and public institutions.

Connors, Andrew. "Building Baltimore." The Christian Century 132, no. 18 (2015): 11-13. Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD), a 37 year-old coalition of faith-based, community, and school-focused organization facilitates face-to-face dialogue between Baltimore PD officers and residents in a trust building effort. BUILD instituted a weekly program, "Turnaround Tuesday," designed to facilitate employment of persons engaged in the informal drug economy. Connor reports some initially encouraging though limited findings about job placement outcomes.

Deuchar, Ross, Johanne Miller, and Mark Barrow. "Breaking down barriers with the usual suspects: findings from a research-informed intervention with police, young people and residents in the West of Scotland." Youth justice 15, no. 1 (2015): 57-75. Deuchar, *et al*. examine work undertaken in one of the most distressed neighborhoods in the west of Scotland, where conditions are characterized by high unemployment, low educational attainment, and a lack of trust and reciprocity between young people, local residents and the police (57). Police and older residents often stereotype youth in such areas as being inherently criminal, leading to cyclical distrust between young persons, older persons, and police that contributes to a defensive mentality and a reinforcement of distrust. To combat this downward spiral, the neighborhood implemented "community integration workshops" aimed at fostering "deliberative dialogue focused around common areas of concern and anxiety" (62). This study aligns with other research in affirming the value of deliberative dialogue among local groups of mutually mistrustful people, as well as related efforts centered on 'pastoral policing' via roles such as campus police officers at local schools, and the "fostering of power-sharing processes and the building of social capital and promotion of collective efficacy" (72).

Duffee, D. E., R. Fluellen, and B. C. Renauer. "Community Variables in Community Policing." Police Quarterly 2, no. 1 (1999): 5-35.

Earnest, Garee W. "Evaluating community leadership programs." Journal of Extension 34, no. 1 (1996): 1-7. This study evaluates several leadership programs of the Ohio State University Extension Leadership Center in order to identifying effects of community leadership development programs on participants' leadership skills. The study assesses the impact of each community leadership program on the leadership skills acquired by program participants. Pre- and post-assessments indicated that the participants improved their leadership skills and practices in several key categories of performance. Consistent with separate research by Pigg (1999), survey respondents associated their improved leadership efficacy with increased community networking, improved social interaction abilities, greater self-confidence and motivation as they relate to community involvement, and better self-awareness of leadership roles and responsibilities. Based on these findings, Earnest recommends a two-stage program structure that integrates skills awareness with practical application.

Farley, Reynolds. "The waning of American apartheid?" Contexts 10, no. 3 (2011): 36-43. Farley reexamines the issue of residential segregation in America. Through an analysis of census data, Farley notes that while segregation has steadily declined, continued exclusion from housing and labor markets have left black families with an asset-deficit compared to white families.

Fearon, James D., Macartan Humphreys, and Jeremy M. Weinstein. "Can development aid contribute to social cohesion after civil war? Evidence from a field experiment in post-conflict Liberia." The American Economic Review 99, no. 2 (2009): 287-291. This study finds "evidence that the introduction of new local-level institutions can alter patterns of social cooperation in a way that persists after the program's conclusion" (291). The authors instituted a field experiment in Liberia in which randomly selected communities received a community-building intervention that established "local-level institutions". Examples of local-level institutions included a "public goods game" in which residents were given a community currency, worth one week's wages, which they could either keep for themselves or contribute to a community project. The authors found that, given the resource and the power to improve their communities, resident chose to contribute their funds to community projects rather than keep the money for themselves – this despite longstanding local feuds, fragmented loyalties, and a lack of faith in democratic values. This behavioral change toward increased cooperation appears durable post-treatment. The treatment may have also changed the behavior of leadership in the communities by diffusing power away from local chiefs and into the hands of non-traditional leaders i.e. women.

Forthofer, Melinda S. "Building Capacity in Disadvantaged Communities: Development of the Community Advocacy and Leadership Program." Progress in Community Health Partnerships: Research, Education, and Action 9, no. 1 (2015): 113-27. The authors discuss and evaluate the Community Advocacy and Leadership

Program (CALP). Objectives of the program included delivery of capacity building education to residents from disadvantaged neighborhoods with high chronic disease burden. The study finds that a capacity building curriculum can be successfully instituted by laypersons, including grant application training.

Foster-Fishman, Pennie G, Pierce, Steven J, Van Egeren, and Laurie A. "Who Participates and Why: Building a Process Model of Citizen Participation." Health Education & Behavior 36, no. 3 (2009): 550-69. This article makes the intuitive claim that "when residents feel connected to their neighbors and believe that by working together change is feasible, they are more likely to be active, engaged citizens" (566). The authors contribute to the understanding of civic participation by clarifying why confidence and connectivity are associated with higher levels of civic participation. The answer is deceptively simple: "because [such conditions] build the expectation that residents will be involved" i.e. such conditions cast civic involvement as a *social norm* (566). If individuals perceive that their neighbors will be civically engaged, they will also be more likely to be civic engaged. Participation is, of course, a communal act and not solely the product of individual traits. The authors suggest "that practitioners should carefully consider whom they want to engage in a community initiative and then focus on the factors most likely to facilitate the participation of that group of residents" (567). "Providing targeted training and opportunities for skill development is important for residents and may be one of the best means for encouraging greater participation among self-identified neighborhood leaders" who tend to participate more when they feel they have the skills necessary to tackle the problem at hand (567). "In neighborhoods where community conditions are weak and residents lack normative expectations for participation, it may be particularly important to build organizing skills among leaders" (568).

Foster-Fishman, Pennie, G. Cantillon, Daniel Pierce, and Steven Egeren. "Building an Active Citizenry: The Role of Neighborhood Problems, Readiness, and Capacity for Change." American Journal of Community Psychology 39, no. 1 (2007): 91-106. The authors attempt to explain why community-building initiatives (CBIs) find it difficult to mobilize the communities they seek to serve. The study found that "while perceptions of neighborhood problems was the strongest predictor of whether an individual became involved at all, perceived strength of neighborhood leadership was the strongest predictor of an individual's level of activity." In other words, glaring neighborhood issues prompted civic engagement but it took leadership to foster sustained involvement (96, 99, 101). The implications of this study are that CBI's must prioritize developing community leadership in order to achieve their stated goals of civic engagement.

Fox, Andrew M., Charles M. Katz, David E. Choate, and E. C. Hedberg. "Evaluation of the Phoenix TRUCE Project: A Replication of Chicago CeaseFire." Justice Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2015): 85-115. This study evaluates the efficacy of Phoenix's version of CeaseFire, called TRUCE. In addition to indicating the general efficacy of street-level intervention by "interrupters" and outreach workers, the results also provide more evidence that programs modeled on CeaseFire can effectively channel non-traditional leadership toward prosocial objectives in high-risk urban neighborhoods. The study also highlights the importance of providing outreach workers with better cross-cultural leadership skills necessary to mediate between black and Hispanic gangs.

Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. 30th Anniversary ed. New York: Continuum, 2000. Freire argues that extent of dialogue within educational practices is indicative of the values being inculcated in students by the educator/institution. The global standard of educational practices, according to Freire, is the "banking model" in which the educator is a regarded as a "bank" of knowledge while students are treated as "depositories" of that knowledge – it is a low-dialogue and paternalistic model that emphasizes obedience and prepares students for life in an authoritarian society. Freire contends that the banking model extends to other institutions, including welfare, in which individuals take on a subordinate identity and eschew responsibility (60). Freire proposes an alternative pedagogy based on a student-teacher relationship in which both are "critical co-investigators", meaning that the production of knowledge is understood to be a collaborative, dialog driven effort among political equals who possess different skills, knowledges, and experiences but nonetheless share a common desire to learn more about their world (68). In this model, the instructor may be regarded as particularly erudite, but not a social superior – Freire contends that all persons possess valuable knowledge yet to be imparted to others and thus they should be valued and respected (81). Freire's alternative model emphasizes respect, dialogue, transparency, accountability, responsibility, self-empowerment, and collaboration among social equals who accept, and embrace, their relative differences as members of a single human family. Freire's work informs the Community Based Participatory Research (CBPR) movement.

Furman, Lou, and McCrary, Alison R. "Building Trust in Law Enforcement: Community-police Mediation in New Orleans." Louisiana Bar Journal 63, no. 3 (2015): 192. Furman et al details a Community-Police Mediation Program initiated by the New Orleans Office of the Independent Police Monitor and funded by a grant from the Department of Justice's Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS). Becoming a national model of trust building, says the author, "the program exemplifies the essential principles and standards of community mediation". This program responds to misconduct complaints and assigns two mediators, which match the demographic profile of the officer and civilian involved. "The aims of the mediation program are…: to create mutual understanding between civilians and police officers, to establish the legitimacy of

mediation, and to improve compliance and cooperation in mediation". The specific principles of the program are: (1) ensure mediation is voluntary; (2) ensure mediation is confidential; (3) offer bilingual mediators or translators in mediation; (4) ensure mediation is for issues that meet the inclusion criteria; (5) ensure mediation does not replace police accountability; (6) clearly explain the mediation outcome; (7) provide officer incentives to participate in mediation; (8) deliver the project with trained mediators; (9) recognize the power differential between police and civilians; and (10) record success of mediation. With these principles in mind, the mediations attempt to establish condition under which community leadership can be developed.

*Galdos, Susana, Luz Dussan Márquez, Mary, Lacayo Flores, Mario, Parajón, Argentina, and Omar Cortedano Larios. "Guide for Training Community Leaders to Improve Leadership and Management Practices." Management Sciences for Health with USAID, (2008).

Gallmeyer, Alice, and Wade T. Roberts. "Payday lenders and economically distressed communities: A spatial analysis of financial predation." The Social Science Journal 46, no. 3 (2009): 521-538. This study finds that payday lending institutions are located in areas with high proportions of unemployed/under-employed persons, immigrants, racial and ethnic minorities, retired age persons, and particularly military personnel. However, payday lenders avoid severely distressed communities, preferring "modestly impoverished communities" instead (533). This geographic clustering of payday lenders is unsurprising yet the presence of payday lenders indicates the "poverty penalty" faced by distressed communities as a result of their relatively vulnerable economic positions. "While offering apparently needed services to populations that are often underserved or alienated by traditional banking establishments", the authors argue, "the presence of payday lenders nonetheless represents a financial hazard to communities and serves as a signal to residents of the economic uncertainty which surrounds them" (533).

Gebo, Erika, Brenda J. Bond, and Krystal S. Campos. "The OJJDP Comprehensive Gang Strategy." The handbook of gangs (2015): 392. The Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM) is described by the authors as a flexible yet "coherent way to identify and organize agencies and services toward a common goal" (392), rather than a rigid "program". Among the tactics and approaches of the CGM are "social intervention" to suppress gang recruitment and "community mobilization" to coordinate community members and leaders with formal agencies – these interweaving trajectories constitute the community leadership aspects of the CGM. Community and formal agency coordination is attempted through a joint steering committee which aims to inject "community voice" into formal decision making (400). Social Disorganization Theory (SDT) is the primary theoretical underpinning of the CGM, thus CGM emphasizes bringing influential

prosocial forces within the community, such as business owners and church leaders, into alignment around gang intervention efforts.

Gebo, Erika, and Bond, Brenda J. Looking beyond Suppression: Community Strategies to Reduce Gang Violence. Lanham [Md.]: Lexington Books, 2012. et al examine the Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM) to reduce gang violence. This model involves law enforcement coordinating with social service agencies, businesses, and schools to intervene in gang recruitment, initiations, and sustained membership. It is an approach to gang violence that encompasses not only law enforcement tactics but also outreach to current or potential gang members intended to illuminate alternatives to gang-involvement. This is predicated on research that indicates gang-involvement to be partially a response to the conditions of concentrated poverty and lack of jobs/services. The model was implemented from 2005-2009 throughout the state of Massachusetts and was partially state funded. CGM was shown to be most efficacious in "emerging" gang sites but showed little effect where gangs had become entrenched.

Gray, Brenda C., Tiffiney R. Gray, and Barrett Hatches. "A Grounded Theory of Beneficial Inner City Redevelopment." Researcher: An Interdisciplinary Journal 24, no. 1 (2011). The authors examine "what practices and conditions constitute 'successful' inner city redevelopment or redevelopment that meets preliminary criteria for 'success' based upon social equity and environmental quality indicators" (82). They answer this question through a literature review. The report finds that "a critical factor [of success] is mobilizing resources—human, social, political, natural, and fiscal—to convert inner-city images of disinvestment, poverty, blight, decay, and abandonment into vibrant cities in which residents have access to hope, to resources, and to basic human needs" (97). Resources cannot be effectively mobilized and the "image" of the inner-city cannot be transformed without leadership. "Leadership refers to '… motivating, and enabling others to contribute toward the effectiveness and success…' of their respective cause (89). By "image" the authors literally mean how the neighborhood looks. They find that a community is "successfully" redeveloped when it conforms to the image of middle-class and above neighborhoods. The authors' findings reaffirm the necessity of community leadership.

Griffith, Allen, Zimmerman, Morrel-Samuels, Reischl, Cohen, and Campbell. "Organizational Empowerment in Community Mobilization to Address Youth Violence." American Journal of Preventive Medicine 34, no. 3 (2008): S89-99. This study focuses on the Youth Violence Prevention Center (YVPC) in Flint, Michigan. "Leadership and the mutual trust of members" are crucial to the "intraorganizational infrastructure" of the center (S89). A primary way that YVPC encourages community leadership development is through Community-based participatory research (CBPR) principles. "This approach is particularly well suited for youth violence prevention because it brings together diverse partners with multiple skills, expertise, and sensitivities

to examine and address complex problems in culturally appropriate ways; increases the relevance, usefulness, and quality of intervention research and resulting programs; improves all partners' research and program development capacity; and enhances the potential to overcome distrust of research by communities that have historically been the focus of such research" (S97). The authors find that when community members are valued for their knowledge they are more likely to take on leadership qualities and a sense of civic responsibility.

Griffiths, Elizabeth, and Johnna Christian. "Considering Focused Deterrence in the Age of Ferguson, Baltimore, North Charleston, and Beyond." Criminology & Public Policy 14, no. 3 (2015): 573-81. Griffiths et al discuss Chicago's Group Violence Reduction Strategy (VRS), which involves "hour-long 'call-ins' among carefully selected members of violent gang factions, local police, federal prosecutors, *community leaders*, and social service providers" (573). Suspects are "notified" of an impending police crackdown, while community members, owing to their moral authority, offer both shame and the possibility of redemption. This engenders informal social control by the suspects themselves once they are aware of being under the gaze of both the police and the community (574). The authors imply that leveraging "visible" community leadership (see Hickman and Sorenson 2013) as part of focused deterrence proceedings may have unintended negative consequences: young men who are subject to informal surveillance may avoid hospitals.

Hagstrom, Aaron. The LAPD community safety partnership: An experiment in policing. University of Southern California, 2014. This journalism thesis details the comprehensive effort to build trust between residents of the Jordan Downs housing project, in Watts, LA County CA, and the LAPD. Central to this mission is the LAPD Community Safety Project. Through the CSP, LAPD officers engage residents to identify and resolve chronic issues that contribute to crime and gang activity – officers have cleaned up neglected alleyways, coordinated testing for disease, and even hosted field trips for kids. Although the CSP does not emphasize leadership development, its operations may be instructive as to how PD's can contribute to conditions under which prosocial leadership may emerge in such high-risk environments. Leadership outlets in Watts housing projects are currently the Grape Street Crips and Bounty Hunter Bloods; past suppression efforts by the LAPD may have driven residents into the ranks of such organizations. The CSP, according to this report, has drastically changed the relationship between residents and LAPD, which has increased the moral authority of police and built trust. This newfound trust is a vital condition for the development of prosocial leadership in conjunction with public safety efforts.

Hays, Richard Allen. "Neighborhood Networks, Social Capital, and Political Participation: The Relationships Revisited." Journal of Urban Affairs 37, no. 2 (2015): 122-43. Hays finds that two factors determine levels of political participation in

distressed communities: 1) length of residence in the neighborhood and 2) belief that the neighborhood has a positive future (138). Three indicators commonly hypothesized to be associated with increased levels of political participating, "joining with neighbors, speaking with a political leader, or speaking with a religious leader", were counterintuitively found to have little to no impact, wich contradicts the findings of Putnam's *Bowling Alone* (2000) (137). These findings suggests that "hope" and "confidence" combine into a feeling of civic-commitment that engenders civic participation.

Henry, David B., Shannon Knoblauch, and Rannveig Sigurvinsdottir. "The effect of intensive ceasefire intervention on crime in four Chicago police beats: Quantitative assessment." Retrieved April 7 (2014): 2015. This study provides a quantitative analysis of two years' worth of activity by the CeaseFire program in Chicago, IL. CeaseFire aims to "(1) locate and interrupt local and ongoing conflicts using conflict mediation techniques, (2) change behaviors of high risk participants, and (3) organize activities and events in the community aimed at changing norms accepting of violence" (4). "Trained violence interrupters and outreach workers prevent shootings by identifying and mediating potentially lethal conflicts in the community, and following up to ensure that the conflict does not reignite" (http://cureviolence.org/the-model/essential-elements/). These workers are "culturally-appropriate", meaning that they are drawn from similar backgrounds as those found in the community they serve. The primary tool of CeaseFire is conflict mediation, which hinges almost entirely upon the facilitative leadership ability of outreach workers.

Hickman, Gill Robinson, and Georgia J. Sorenson. The power of invisible leadership: How a compelling common purpose inspires exceptional leadership. Sage Publications, 2013. "Invisible leadership" refers to "situations in which dedication to a compelling and deeply held common purpose is the motivating force behind leadership" (3). This contrasts leadership that is self-interested or the product of norms/expectations i.e. business owners. The authors advocate for an approach to leadership in which leaders are not seen as a person but rather as a role (5). "The use of leader-as-role allows for a more fluid and multifaceted process where responsibility can be distributed among multiple actors or concentrated in one person", depending on the challenge at hand (5). Community leadership programs should not try and leverage extraordinary people but instead develop ordinary people to inhabit extraordinary roles through uniting a community around a common goal.

Hope, Tim. "Community Crime Prevention." Crime and Justice 19 (1995): 21-89. Social Disorganization Theory (SDT) tends to foster an "image of high-crime neighborhoods as an atomized collection of isolated households" (69). Crime is assumed to proliferate because of this "isolation". Hope calls SDT into question. Repetitive victimization suggests that high-poverty areas are indeed organized, just not according to

the rules of middle-class neighborhoods. "Ethnographic research in slum neighborhoods", Hope explains, "has often found strong primary links between residents", thus contradicting a commonly accepted association between high-poverty and extreme social fragmentation. This observation has potentially important implications: living in a high-poverty area engenders a specific social skill set and expertise; not everyone experiences the same degree of vulnerability because not everyone has the same level of skills and expertise. Some are better able to navigate social risks, including criminal victimization, and this ability appears to depend upon understanding the social *organization* as it is found in distressed communities. These same persons – who possess relevant social skills for avoiding criminal victimization - may be the *community's most effective leaders*.

Horsford, Sonya, and Carrie Sampson. "Promise Neighborhoods: The Promise and Politics of Community Capacity Building as Urban School Reform." Urban Education 49, no. 8 (2014): 955. Evaluates the U.S. Department of Education's Promise Neighborhoods (PNs) program according to Chaskin's model of community capacity, which emphasizes community leadership development. One of the specific goals of the PNs program is "resident engagement and community leadership". The authors find that many PNs initiatives are "extremely *ineffective* in harnessing…human capital and individual leadership at the neighborhood level with most convenings and meetings filled with agency administrators, elected officials, and staff representatives rather than…residents" (979). The PNs program is a policy making environment and hierarchical structure that lends itself to state and professional domination, thus failing in its objective to develop community leaders. The authors conclude that it does not incorporate a serious commitment to community engagement despite rhetorical commitments to building community capacity.

*Israel, Barbara A., Amy J. Schulz, Edith A. Parker, Adam B. Becker, Alex J. Allen, and J. Ricardo Guzman. "Critical issues in developing and following community based participatory research principles." Community-based participatory research for health 1 (2003): 53-76.

Jennings, James. Welfare Reform and the Revitalization of Inner City Neighborhoods. Black American and Diasporic Studies. East Lansing, Mich.: Michigan State University Press, 2003. Jennings addresses the impacts of the Clinton era welfare reforms which allowed states to the control the allocation of TANF funds within broad guidelines. The purpose of these reforms were to reduce the welfare rolls and increase employment among the recipients, with an assumption that distressed communities would benefit from more self-reliant residents (4). Jennings claims that reform disproportionately harmed non-white recipients and obstructed other poverty relief efforts already underway, thereby contributing to community distress.

Kahne, Joseph, and Ellen Middaugh. "High quality civic education: What is it and who gets it?" Social Education 72, no. 1 (2008): 34. Kahne observes that there appears to be little to no commitment to civic education in public schools located in high-poverty minority neighborhoods – civic education is regarded as a luxury that only more well financed schools districts can afford (40). This has dire implications for the civic capacity of the inner-city: emerging adults in distressed communities are robbed of the civic-capabilities needed to meaningfully participate in American democracy.

Hillstrom, Kathryn, Ruelas, Valerie, Peters, Anne, Gedebu-Wilson, Turusew, and Ellen Iverson. "A Retrospective Analysis of the Capacity Built through a Community-Based Participatory Research Project Addressing Diabetes and Obesity in South and East Los Angeles." Health 06, no. 12 (2014): 1429-435. Hillstrom et al evaluate the Keck Diabetes Prevention Initiative (KDPI) – a program that used CBPR to address the high prevalence of Diabetes and Obesity in low-income minority neighborhoods. CBPR appears to provide the notion of community leadership with a powerful rationale in that community members are a vital components of the knowledge-production process and the eventual solution to the problem being addressed – i.e. community leadership is made particularly meaningful through CBPR principles. This study provides more evidence that "CBPR is an empowering research methodology which, done correctly, can build community capacity and have a long-term impact on individuals and communities" (1435).

Keating, Kari H. "Training civic bridge builders: Outcomes of community leadership development programs." PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2011. Keating finds that poorer individuals actually display more personal growth and skill development when they engage in leadership programs than wealthier persons. This findings reframes high-poverty areas as ripe for leadership development. Moreover, youth and women show more development from leadership programs than do adults and men.

*Kilcullen, David J. "Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency." (2006). Accessed September 26, 2016.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/uscoin/3pillars_of_counterinsurgency.pdf

Kim, Julia, Giulia Ferrari, Tanya Abramsky, Charlotte Watts, James Hargreaves, Linda Morison, Godfrey Phetla, John Porter, and Paul Pronyk. "Assessing the Incremental Effects of Combining Economic and Health Interventions: The IMAGE Study in South Africa." Bulletin of the World Health Organization 87, no. 11 (2009): 824-32.

Kirk, Philip, and Anna Marie Shutte. "Community leadership development." Community Development Journal 39, no. 3 (2004): 234-251. Kirk and Shutte discuss

the community leadership development effort of the Resource and Development Foundation (RDF) in Stellenbosch, South Africa. The RDF exemplifies "a community leadership development framework that comprises three components: leading change through dialogue, collective empowerment and connective leadership" (234). "Dialog" and "collective empowerment" are largely self-explanatory. "Connective leadership" entails "helping individuals connect with their goals (establishing their roles); helping members collectively to explore the possibilities and potential of connecting with a common goal (effective team working); helping to create and sustain a creative space where collective leadership can flourish" (242). Connective leadership is highly facilitative and service-oriented, thereby drawing moral authority to leaders based upon the degree to which they directly help individual community members.

Kirshner, Ben. "Guided Participation in Three Youth Activism Organizations: Facilitation, Apprenticeship, and Joint Work." Journal of the Learning Sciences 17, no. 1 (2008): 60-101. Kirshner compaares and contrasts Youth Engaged in Leadership and Learning (YELL), Youth Rising, and Teens Restoring the Urban Environment (TRUE). All three operate youth leadership programs in distressed urban communities. In each program, significant tensions developed between youth participants and adult facilitators: adults wanted projects to be youth led but also felt the need to control complex processes while youth wanted autonomy but also guidance. "Adults managed these tensions by guiding youths' participation in different ways: facilitation, apprenticeship, and joint work" (73). YELL depends most upon "facilitation" because the primary objective of YELL is to produce capable and independent youth leaders. In contrast, Youth Rising followed an apprenticeship model (coaching) because it balanced leadership development with campaign success while TRUE used "joint work" between youth and adults, termed "senior colleagues", because it focused solely on campaign success. This article is instructive regarding the relationship between potential leaders and their instructors/coaches/facilitators: a successful relationship between support staff and emerging leaders is determined by the goals of the organization. Had YELL used a "joint work" approach, for example, it may have undermined its own goal of graduating competent leaders.

Kong, B. Waine. "Community-based hypertension control programs that work." Journal of health care for the poor and underserved 8, no. 4 (1997): 409-415. Kong argues that the chronic problems of poor African-American communities cannot be addressed through "formal" and "established" means. For example, hypertension disproportionately effects these communities and efforts of doctors, nurses, and hospitals, i.e. the "medical establishment", seem to have limited impact in terms of encouraging preventative medicine (410). This should be unsurprising: institutions that are "formal", "mainstream", and "established", have been constructed with a middle class white majority in mind. Thus, to address problems that concentrate among poor African-

Americans, one must look outside the box of solutions that seem to work for middle class whites such as regular doctor visits and checkups. The author instead examines how "churches, barbershops, beauty salons, firehouses, housing projects, and worksites—can play a valuable role in increasing the number of African American hypertensives who receive treatment" (409). In order to fully leverage these informal resources, doctors must be willing to act as consultants of "lay volunteers", who are by some accounts also "community leaders" (411).

Macdonald, John, and Robert Stokes. "Race, Social Capital, and Trust in the Police." Urban Affairs Review 41, no. 3 (2006): 358-75. Poor, urban Black-Americans are hypothesized as having "depleted levels of perceived community social capital" that "contribute[s] to higher levels of distrust of local police" (358). This study finds that black-Americans who experience *high* levels of social capital still distrust the police. "That is, being Black in America is a far stronger predictor of a citizen's level of trust in the police than self-reported levels of social capital of their neighborhood" (369). The findings suggest that increasing perceived social capital, including intra-community leadership, will not resolve the trust-deficit between urban high-risk, poor black residents and police. The authors instead suggest that "police agencies should focus on activities that foster improvements in the quality of life of inner-city communities" (371).

Maimon, David, and Christopher R. Browning. "Unstructured Socializing, Collective Efficacy, And Violent Behavior Among Urban Youth*." Criminology 48, no. 2 (2010): 443-74. Maimon et al confirm a long suspected connection between low levels of collective efficacy, unstructured socializing among youth, and violent crime. 'Collective efficacy' refers to "trust, local attachment, and informal social control capacity" (447). Examples of unstructured socializing are "riding around in a car for fun, going to parties, and spending evenings out for fun and recreation" – all of which are highly correlated with "criminal behavior, alcohol and drug use, and dangerous driving" (446). Unstructured socializing in an environment of low collective efficacy produces conditions under which youth are likely to engage in violence.

Mandarano, Lynn. "Civic Engagement Capacity Building." Journal of Planning Education and Research 35, no. 2 (2008): 174-87. Mandarano looks at 5 "planning academies" and their "focus on training emerging or established community/citizen leaders" in partnership with local planning agencies (175). The findings of this study suggest that "planning academies", where participants learn the language and professional norms of urban planning, may be a useful outlet for emerging leaders in distressed communities beset by infrastructural issues.

Austin Turner, Margery, Edelman, Peter, Poethig, Erika, and Laudan Aron with Matthew Rogers and Christopher Lowenstein. "Tackling Persistent Poverty in Distressed Urban Neighborhoods History, Principles, and Strategies for

Philanthropic Investment." The Urban Institute, (2010). This report discusses alternatives to the "place-based" models of intervention in distressed communities. Prior approaches to community development and community building have tried to improve high-poverty neighborhoods in an attempt to improve the lives of the families that live there. The authors argue this approach has had limited success and advocate for a shift from the "place-based" paradigm to a "place-conscious" perspective. Place-conscious initiatives acknowledge 1) "many of the opportunities families need to thrive are located outside their immediate neighborhoods" 2) "the optimal scale for tackling neighborhood challenges varies across policy domains", thus requiring horizontal integration of sectors within neighborhoods and vertical integration of city, state, and federal resources 3) "no single organization can perform all the tasks and activities needed to transform a distressed neighborhood" 4) place-conscious strategies are evidence based 5) "Poor people move a lot, and the mobility of these households creates both challenges and opportunities for neighborhoods". In short, the place-conscious paradigm acknowledges the challenges faced by residents of distressed neighborhoods and focuses on improving lives of families rather than the neighborhood itself; neighborhood improvement is then a byproduct of stabilizing and improving family life. An example of a place-conscious initiative could be approaching unemployment with the recognition that literal access to jobs may be better resolved with new bus lines, assistance buying cars, and enrollment within city-or region-wide training and placement programs rather than attempting to create dead-end, low-wage service jobs within distressed neighborhoods. Another example is severing the connection between neighborhood and school choice by allowing parents to choose schools based on preference and needs.

Massey, Douglas S., and Denton, Nancy A. American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. *American Apartheid* reintroduced segregation as a significant factor in community distress. Urban Renewal, redlining, and Public Housing are all examples of public policy that can be empirically demonstrated to cause segregation.

Matthews, Todd L., Lynn M. Hempel, and Frank M. Howell. "Gender and the Transmission of Civic Engagement: Assessing the Influences on Youth Civic Activity*." Sociological Inquiry 80, no. 3 (2010): 448-74. Todd et al find that "insofar as parents transmit civic engagement to their children, this transmission may occur largely through involvement in their child's school" (469). This effect was equally strong on male and female youth, contradicting decades of hypotheses that predicted a greater effect of parental school-involvement for male youths. The study also found that "a family's socioeconomic status, as measured by education, may play a far greater role in shaping who participates for females relative to males" (469).

McBride, Amanda Moore, Sherraden, Margaret S., and Pritzker, Suzanne. "Civic Engagement among Low-Income and Low-Wealth Families: In Their Words." Family Relations 55, no. 2 (2006): 152-62. McBride et al confirm the intuitive hypothesis that "that people of limited resources may be civically engaged, but that their limited resources and those of their communities curtail their ability to be more engaged" (159). Much of these challenges stem from parenting in a low-wealth environments which puts stress on reserves of "extra" time. Another critical factor was lack of transportation (161).

Miao, Tai-An, Karen Umemoto, Deanna Gonda, and Earl Hishinuma. "Essential Elements for Community Engagement in Evidence-Based Youth Violence Prevention." American Journal of Community Psychology 48, no. 1 (2011): 120-32. Maio et al describe the evidence-based youth violence prevention efforts of the Asian/Pacific Islander Youth Violence Prevention Center (API Center), supported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. ''Evidence based'' (EB) programs are "shown through scientific research as being effective in reaching their intended outcomes" (120). Fidelity to EB principles means that a program systematically and routinely evaluates itself and allows third parties to do so as well – this requires transparency and a certain attitude towards self-improvement and critique. The authors claim that the API exemplifies fidelity to EB principles by leveraging community leaders as evaluators of the program's efficacy and as active partners. "This has been done by: (a) organizing training activities; (b) subsidizing community members to attend training activities; (c) bringing outside organizations in to provide training attached to a specific project; (d) tapping leaders from within to share their expertise; and (e) continually encouraging active participants to take on greater leadership roles" (128). Thus, according to the authors, API fuses social capital building with EB into a robust *community accountability*. API primarily offers training to interested persons looking to gain or sharpen their skills regarding youth violence – such persons attend seminars where they learn various techniques of intervention, coaching, and mediation.

Moore, Nataka, Matara Wright, Jessica Gipson, Greg Jordan, Mohit Harsh, Daniel Reed, Marcus Murray, Mary Kate Keeter, and Adam Murphy. "A Survey of African American Men in Chicago Barbershops: Implications for the Effectiveness of the Barbershop Model in the Health Promotion of African American Men." Journal of community health (2016): 1-8. Despite the widespread acceptance of the "barbershop" model, in which barbers in predominantly poor African American communities are trained as informal community health workers, survey data collected by Moore et al indicates that 1) customers would rather get heath advice from a formal clinician or a church over a barber 2) barbers generally feel that without additional training they cannot effectively influence the health decision of their customers. This data implies that programs intended to address chronic neighborhood issues through less

formal or informal means need to be foregrounded by an investigation of the needs and wants of the community and an evidenced based assessment of the capabilities of informal service providers.

Oliver, Eric. "Civic Capacity and the Authentic Governance Principle: Understanding Social Contexts and Citizen Participation in Metropolitan America." In *Paper for the Conference on Democracy*, Princeton University. 2000. Finding problems inherent to both classical liberal/public choice theory and civil society/social capital, Oliver posits a "civic capacity argument". Civic capacity is the extent to which a community's residents are voluntarily engaged and connected with the public realm through both political and civic activities.

Page, Stephen. "A Strategic Framework for Building Civic Capacity." Urban Affairs Review (2015): 1078087415596848. Page finds that building civic capacity depends upon emphasizing common ground rather than differences, even if difference is central to the "wicked" problems that plague distressed communities. Civic capacity is about efficient and *real* power sharing, which requires that barriers to information are deemed unacceptable and decisions are jointly made from within a single, accessible, egalitarian institution. Power struggles over issue-framing can obstruct the building of civic capacity; elites are well positioned to impose their frames and grassroots leaders should gain their support before attempting to reframe the issues.

Papachristos, Andrew V., and David S. Kirk. "Changing the Street Dynamic: Evaluating Chicago's Group Violence Reduction Strategy." Criminology & Public Policy 14, no. 3 (2015): 525-58. The authors find the Chicago's Group Violence Reduction Strategy (VRS) reduces gun violence by 23% in terms of overall shooting behavior and 32% in terms of gunshot victimization up to one year after treatment. The VRS model utilizes one hour "call-in" session where suspects are brought before a procedural justice panel which includes select community members. These community members use a combination of shaming and incentivizing to help inculcate self-regulation among the suspects regarding near-future violence. Formal law-enforcement professionals augment the influence of community members with threats of a crackdown. The results appear to be a significant reduction in gun-violence and new outlets for community leadership.

*Papachristos, Andrew V., David M. Hureau, and Anthony A. Braga. "The corner and the crew: the influence of geography and social networks on gang violence." American sociological review (2013): 0003122413486800.

*Papachristos, Andrew V., Tracey L. Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan. "Why do criminals obey the law? The influence of legitimacy and social networks on active gun offenders." The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (2012): 397-440.

Pigg, Kenneth E. "Community leadership and community theory: A practical synthesis." Community Development 30, no. 2 (1999): 196-212. Pigg's argues that traditional leadership models focus on inculcating new behaviors within potential leaders such as public speaking, ethical decision making, and role modeling. These models also assumed who makes the best leader and where/how they ought to lead without evidence. Pigg upends the traditional leadership paradigm, showing that effective community leadership is a manifestation of relationships and interactions and not an individual's personal talent, will, or skill (189-200). Community leadership education should not emphasize forging an emerging leader in the mold of mythical leaders but rather train individuals how to best leverage and coordinate the reserves of talent, skill, and will already present in their community. An individual is a community leader based upon their role in social networks and not because of their relative economic advantage or access to specialized knowledge. Prominent citizens who wish to be community leaders must prepare themselves to be in near constant contact with residents with an aim of coordinating the diffused power they encounter. Community leaders are closer to talent scouts than performers.

Pronyk, Paul M., Trudy Harpham, Joanna Busza, Godfrey Phetla, Linda A. Morison, James R. Hargreaves, Julia C. Kim, Charlotte H. Watts, and John D. Porter. "Can social capital be intentionally generated? A randomized trial from rural South Africa." Social science & medicine 67, no. 10 (2008): 1559-1570. Pronyk et al determine if social capital, defined by the authors as "solidarity, reciprocity and social group membership", can be intentionally generated. Researchers devised a randomized study in which some South African communities hosted Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and Gender Equity (IMAGE), which offered "access to credit through group-based microfinance services for income-generating activities" to women (1561). IMAGE did not directly attempt to develop leadership. However, the women who successfully gained microloans through IMAGE not only displayed initial leadership potential, they also became community leaders by way of their resulting financial success. In this way, IMAGE bolstered community leadership as part of overall community social capital. Results of the treatment decisively showed that addressing community economic needs through microcredit catalyzed social capital in all respects, despite extremes of poverty and the lingering effects of socially destabilizing labor migration..

*Public Health Management Corporation. "Findings from the Philadelphia Urban Ace Survey." Institute for Safe Families (2013).

Richey, Sean. "Manufacturing trust: Community currencies and the creation of social capital." Political Behavior 29, no. 1 (2007): 69-88. This study evaluates the trust-building efficacy of a "community currency" program in Japan. "A community currency is a local "money" that is only useable within a neighborhood or town. In a

typical community currency program, a town rewards civic volunteers with credits to barter with other citizens, use at participating stores, or pay for town services. These programs are specifically designed to stimulate generalized trust by rewarding civic engagement and encouraging social interaction" (69). The author concludes that the program does indeed build general trust among community members "through shared experiences and social activities (83). This finding serves as more evidence that social capital – which is theorized to be vital to civic capacity and leadership development – can be generated through government programs.

Rosenbaum, Dennis P. The Challenge of Community Policing: Testing the Promises. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1994. Rosenbaum seeks to clarify what constitutes Community Policing (CP). Whereas the "Professional Law Enforcement" model emphasizes the rule-bound and bureaucratic character of "proper" policing, Rosenbaum highlights the 'watchman" style of community policing, which normalizes a greater degree of officer discretion according to the particular needs of the community being served (16). This is followed by an evaluation of CP's efficacy by various authors. Overall, CP has not lived up to its promises in terms of leveraging public participation on behalf of public safety.

Rosenbaum, Dennis P., and Amie M. Schuck. "Comprehensive community partnerships for preventing crime." (2012). Rosenbaum and Shuck review a multitude of programs that fit within the umbrella of "comprehensive community partnerships", with "an eye toward lessons that can be transferred to crime prevention" (229). The authors find that successful collaborative community initiatives need to take inclusivity and empowerment seriously – an anemic commitment to these principles has sunk many programs and besmirched the credibility of comprehensive community partnerships in general (240). Moreover, caution is required when evaluating these programs as they are exceedingly complex. Whenever possible, CCP's should hold themselves to evidence based practices, institute a steering committee, and establish a common mission that unifies all participating stakeholders (240).

Rosi, C. "The Clemente Course in the Humanities: Longitudinal Evaluation Study (2006–2011)." Retrieved July 6 (2011): 2012. Humanities 101 aims to foster critical thinking skills and heightening general intellectual awareness in a context that engenders deeper community engagement. The program is offered to low-income individuals without traditional means of continuing their education. The program has to overarching goals: 1) to "provide students with a bridge to continuing education in their lives 2) "to foster students' awareness and appreciation of the cultural heritage encompassed by the traditional humanities disciplines" (4). Overall, the author's analysis "shows the positive outcomes of the Clemente course and further reveals its significant, long-lasting impact on graduates and alumni" (64). The study shows that cultivating leadership and solidarity within a community can be achieved through general education in the humanities.

Russon, Craig, and Reinelt, Claire. "The Results of an Evaluation Scan of 55 Leadership Development Programs." Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies 10, no. 3 (2004): 104. Russon and Reinelt note that "community leadership outcomes" are exceedingly difficult to evaluate because organizations balance various priorities that may work at cross purposes, such as individual leadership development and campaign outcomes (see Kirshner 2008) (11). The authors suggest that leadership programs should be evaluated based upon individual leadership "outcomes" and organizational "impact" (6). Outcomes include changes in knowledge, skills, attitudes, and perceptions; changes in behavior; changes in values and beliefs; and changes in relationships. Even if an evaluation finds that a program positively affected on of these leadership outcomes, it has not been fully demonstrated that the leadership program has produced community benefits, thus evaluators must also consider "impacts".

Saegert, Susan, and Gary Winkel. "Crime, Social Capital, and Community Participation." American Journal of Community Psychology 34, no. 3 (2004): 219-33. Saegert and Winkel examines the impact of crime on community participation. The results of their analyses are ambiguous, showing that crime can sometimes push individuals into isolation while at other times crime can an act as a catalyst of social capital (230). Overall, crime is shown to not have a simple relationship with social capital and neighborhood level participation, thus the authors counsel against assumptions that crime will either inhibit or encourage leaders to rise within communities.

Saegert, Susan. "Building civic capacity in urban neighborhoods: An empirically grounded anatomy." Journal of Urban Affairs 28, no. 3 (2006): 275-294. Saegert upends the distinction between "community builders" and "organizers" through a consideration of civic capacity. A synergistic building-organizing strategy, in which a coalition uses formal yet constrained channels of community building *and* confrontational tactics intended to foster social change is indicated for the long-term socioeconomic health of high-poverty communities.

Saegert, Susan. "Community Building and Civic Capacity." Aspen Institute Roundtable on Community Change, CUNY Graduate Center. Accessed September 25, 2016. https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/docs/rcc/CommunityB uildingCivicCapacity.pdf. "Community building" has emerged as a philanthropic and governmental response to the needs of distressed communities. Saegert points out the irony of the community building paradigm: "communities defined by their lack of resources are expected to collectively marshal the wherewithal to overcome their poverty and marginality" (3). This is why 'civic capacity', Saegert argues, is so important to the goals of community building. Civic capacity involves "relationships within a community [that] not only serve as the basis for the community to solve its own problems, [but that are] also are used to obtain resources and influence public policies and the actions of the

private sector that affect the quality of life in the community" (4). Saegert contends that "the identification of CCIs (Comprehensive Community Initiatives) with community building unduly limits our understanding of how community building is achieved, what it accomplishes, and how it relates to community civic capacity"(35). While the rhetoric of CCI's and community building is often underscored by notions of consensus and cooperation, Saegert finds that "confrontation" and some degree of adversarialism are vital to building, and using, civic capacity.

Sampson, Robert J., Stephen W. Raudenbush, and Felton Earls. "Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy." Science 277, no. 5328 (1997): 918-24. Sampson et al define collective efficacy as a "social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good". Collective efficacy manifests as "informal mechanisms by which residents themselves achieve public order" according to shared principles and goals, such a freedom from interpersonal violence (918). The authors measure collective efficacy by determining the willingness of residents to supervise children at play. Neighborhoods with significant numbers of resident willing to supervise children or intervene in nuisances were less likely to experience crime of all types, including homicide (923).

Satterwhite, Frank J. Omowale, and Shiree Teng. "Culturally based capacity building: An approach to working in communities of color for social change." Organizational development and capacity in cultural competence (2007). Leadership initiatives can impose cultural values upon a community, making social fragmentation worse or causing a rejection of the program. This article discusses "culturally based" capacity building i.e. "providing transformational technical support and training services for individuals, organizations, and communities" without the imposition of unwanted value systems. Organization that exemplify this approach include One East Palo Alto and Asian Immigrant Women Advocates (AIWA).

Saville, Gregory. "SafeGrowth: Moving Forward in Neighborhood Development." Built Environment (1978-) 35, no. 3 (2009): 386-402. The SafeGrowth model is "as an integrative planning process for creating safe neighborhoods, improving local trust and cohesion among residents, and reducing crime and fear. Essentially, SafeGrowth is similar to CBPR based programs that bring laypersons from the community on-board the urban planning process as researchers and decisions makers regarding their own neighborhoods. Residents are organized into Neighborhood Safety Teams. The NTS's collaborate with planning experts to craft neighborhood revitalization plans. Crime and safety are the focus of this program, setting it apart from the "planning academies".

Scheffert, Donna Rae. "Community Leadership: What does it take to See Results?" (2007). Scheffert finds unsurprising evidence that duration is a significant factor in the success of community leadership programs; longer programs induce measurably superior

skills and knowledge among participants. However, commitment to post-program leadership roles in the community are not increased through longer duration of training programs – commitment seems to operate independently of how long participants are trained. The study specifically examines U-Lead, the University of Minnesota Extension's community leadership program, and uses a survey instrument to measure the association between individual leadership outcomes and duration of program. Based on survey data of participants in programs of diverse duration, the author concludes that "program length does matter…the longer the program, the more skill and knowledge outcomes can be expected… programs 18 months or longer were transformational" (187). The same appears true in reverse: the shorter the program, the less the developed the leader.

Schutz, Aaron. "Home Is a Prison in the Global City: The Tragic Failure of School-Based Community Engagement Strategies." Review of Educational Research 76, no. 4 (2006): 691-743. School-based Community Engagement Strategies have often failed to produce lasting civic engagement. A confluence of factors are involved in this failure. One is the ambiguous nature of "communtity'. "Because many urban schools serving the inner city have children from many different neighborhoods, "community" can encompass multiple neighborhoods", meaning that a community engagement strategy has to be able to include a possibly vast diversity of persons (693). Few strategies have been able to bridge the social gaps that tend to exist between America's segregated neighborhoods. Moreover, the teachers and administrators of urban schools often have little to no social connections with the "community" they serve – qualification requirements mean that they are often of very different backgrounds than their students. The author finds that "school-based efforts appear to be quite limited in their capacity for sustaining rich local relationships. Even the few urban schools that do seek richer interactions are hampered by underlying distrust and fear, bureaucratic immobility, and a severe lack of resources" (726).

Skogan, W. G., S. M. Hartnett, N. Bump, and J. Dubois. "Evaluation of CeaseFire-Chicago, 2009." (2009). Skogan et al find that Chicago's CeaseFie program reduces homicides and gun violence (iii). CeaseFire recruits and trains community members, often former gang members, to act as conflict-mediation outreach workers; in this way, community leadership is at the core of the program. The authors surmise that a reliance on community leadership is perhaps both the programs strongest asset and its greatest weakness. Trust between police and residents of high-crime, predominantly black neighborhoods, is at an all-time deficit – police may have recognized legal authority but they lack the moral authority to deliver "credible messages" to at-risk, gang-involved youth and adults. Outreach workers, "hired for their personal experience" in the neighborhoods they canvass, are able to deliver a credible message that violence is a counterproductive and myopic response to disputes (4-1). However, "a great obstacle to

building trust and remaining in contact with clients was CeaseFire's staff turnover". Chronic budgetary instability and a combination of "high risks, limited benefits and low wages" held back the program's impact (4-31).

Skogan, Wesley. "Why Reforms Fail." Policing and Society 18, no. 1 (2008): 23-34. Skogan argues that police reform fails for several reasons. "Resistance by mid-level and top managers" who see reforms as threatening their authority have proven a significant obstacle to change; reformers must keep in mind that "departments struggle to keep control of their field force", and sudden changes to the rules by which managers govern their subordinates will engender opposition (24). Front-line supervisors i.e. police Sergeants may be similarly resistant to reform because it makes their day-to-day operations unfamiliar, injecting uncertainty into their routine (26). Rank-and-file officers may see reforms as "passing fads" and they may lack the "by-in" necessary for the reforms to take hold – often they are the last to be consulted about the consequences of changing approaches to policing (26). "Specialized units such as detectives are often threatened by department-wide programs that require them to change their ways" (27). For example, the highly specialized expertise of detectives makes them dismissive of outside interference and resistant to measures that make them transparent to lower-status employees (27). Police unions have sometimes objected to reforms as "political correctness" – unions are gate keepers of police culture and seek to protect their members from what they may see as unreasonable labor demands (28). Reforms can also split scarce resources; "community policing is particularly labor intensive". This can cast reforms as harmful in the eyes of police-managers and city-executives (29). Moreover, community and problem-solving policing is difficult to measure in terms of effectiveness, leading to low internal and public support (30, 31). Inter-agency cooperation can also be destabilized by reforms, leading to inefficiency (31). And lastly, leadership transitions are a perennial threat to reform as new leaders bring new priorities with them (33).

Smock, Kristina. Strategies of Urban Change: A Comparative Analysis of Contemporary Models of Neighborhood-Based Community Organizing. 2000. Smock looks beyond traditional civic organizations (such neighborhood watch, neighborhood associations) that only emphasize *access* to public forums and instead looks to feminist, power-based, transformative, and community-building organizations that emphasize *social change*. Smock finds hat "community organizers could strengthen their efforts by integrating components from different models" and that "the most effective solution may be to create a strategic division of labor between different organizations within the same neighborhood" (481).

South, Scott J., and Kyle D. Crowder. "Escaping Distressed Neighborhoods: Individual, Community, and Metropolitan Influences." American Journal of Sociology 102, no. 4 (1997): 1040-084. By examining the factors that "impede or facilitate the residential mobility or the locational choices of persons initially residing in

impoverished neighborhoods", South et al develop a profile of who is likely to "escape" distressed neighborhoods and why. This study finds that "almost 80% of respondents who began an interval in a poor tract resided in the same tract at the end of the interval" (1058) and that lack of "socioeconomic resources…serve to retain those who already reside in nonpoor neighborhoods, while two life events-the disruption of a marriage and the loss of a job-substantially increase the risk of moving from a nonpoor into a poor area" (1078). "In both the poor and nonpoor tracts, black respondents are more likely than white respondents to be female, unmarried, renting their dwelling, and receiving public assistance" (1059). Meanwhile geographic mobility is positively correlated with binary opposites of those traits i.e. male, married, home-owning, and employed.

Spader, Schuetz, and Cortes. "Fewer Vacants, Fewer Crimes? Impacts of Neighborhood Revitalization Policies on Crime." Regional Science and Urban Economics 60 (2016): 73-84. Spader et al address the association between dilapidated housing stock and crime rates, specifically examining whether initiatives that aim to rehabilitate or demolish foreclosed and vacant properties reduce crime within and adjacent to distressed communities. No evidence is found that shows rehabilitation of sub-standard properties to be crime-reducing and this study casts doubt on demolition as a cure-all of neighborhood distress.

Speer, Paul W., and Brian D. Christens. "An Approach to Scholarly Impact through Strategic Engagement in Community‐Based Research." Journal of Social Issues 69, no. 4 (2013): 734-53. A cluster of community-based research approaches" such as CBR (community based research) "and community-based participatory research (CBPR), are increasingly held as the preferred method for researchers to work with communities" (737). These approaches combine the skills of experts with the lived experience and subtle knowledges of community members – "community-based research is a co-learning and empowering process that facilitates the reciprocal transfer of knowledge, skills, capacity and power" (738). Despite the promise of CBR, the findings generated by democratic approaches to research are unlikely to be implemented if community power dynamics are not taken into careful consideration. "In other words, CBR projects should not be formulated under the misperception that community change and policy impacts will necessarily happen in rational ways" (749). The best ideas are not necessarily the ones that get traction – rather those ideas that take into account social power as it is encountered and seek practical arrangements that do not trigger opposition are the more likely to succeed. This is best achieved when researchers find community partners that are already attuned to the power dynamics of their community (750).

Stone, Clarence N., and Stoker, Robert Phillip. Urban Neighborhoods in a New Era: Revitalization Politics in the Postindustrial City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. Stone argues that neighborhood revitalization efforts must be adapted to

current conditions of post-industrialism i.e. the extinction of manufacturing jobs (35-36), the mistrust of government (23), and the end of federal financial aid to cities (160-167). Urban neighborhoods must look to local resources and become players in local, particularly city, politics (60). Overall, Stone urges community organizers to think outside the box of yesteryears social-change agenda and not let outdated bias obstruct the possibility of productive partnerships with private sector actors (117), city governments, educational and medical institutions, and foundations (240).

Talukdar, Debabrata. "Cost of Being Poor: Retail Price and Consumer Price Search Differences across Inner‑City and Suburban Neighborhoods." Journal of Consumer Research 35, no. 3, 457-71. Talukdar et al examine the notion of the "ghetto tax": generally higher prices for everyday items that are sold in retail stores in high-poverty neighborhoods. Examining grocery stores prices in particular**,** the author finds "significantly high price differentials at stores in the poorest areas. Relative to the lowest available price for a tracked item across all neighborhoods, a shopper can expect to pay on average 11%, 14%, and 22% more at a typical store in the richest, medium, and poorest neighborhoods, respectively (462).

The 2016 Distressed Communities Index. Economic Innovation Group (EIG). 2016. The DCI uses census data to identify distressed communities in the United States. Through a statistical analysis of "fundamental" economic and demographic variables, including measures of educational attainment and unemployment, the DCI scores zip codes with a population of 500 or more on a distress scale of 0-100. 'Community' is held to be synonymous with zip code. A score of 80 or above is considered "distressed" community, indicating that at least "one-quarter of adults have no high school degree and 55 percent of adults are not working" (9). The DCI offers a profile of the "average" distressed zip code and this profile is itself suggestive of causal factors in community distress. According to the DCI, the average distressed zip code has a population where at least 1 in 4 adults lack a high school diploma and 1 in 4 adults live at or below the federal poverty level. Over half of adults in these communities are unemployed and the median household income is only 68% of the state's median income. Moreover, these communities have experienced significant instability, seeing "employment decline by 6.7 percent and the number of businesses shrink by 8.3 percent" in the last 5 years (10). In contrast, the "median community", has seen a modest 2% increase in employment and no loss of business while "prospering" communities have "enjoyed 17.4 percent job growth and saw the number of business establishments in their neighborhoods rise by 8.8 percent (11). The DCI can be interpreted, in the context of more deeply reaching social science investigations, as suggesting a distinction between "proximate" and "underlying" causes of community distress. For example, lack of educational attainment is an immediate proximate cause of community distress while the underlying cause of lack of educational attainment may be various manifestations of racial bias and/or broader economic changes

associated with globalization which have produced "long-term, structural economic problems".

*Training of Facilitators for the Leadership Development Program. Management Sciences for Health, Inc, 2010.

Waasdorp, Tracy, Evian Baker, Courtney Paskewich, and N. Leff. "The Association Between Forms of Aggression, Leadership, and Social Status Among Urban Youth." Journal of Youth and Adolescence 42, no. 2 (2013): 263-74. Wassdorp et al find evidence that aggression, both relational and overt, is positively associated with perceptions of leadership and high-social status in urban high-risk environments. The findings of this study confirm that "displaying relationally aggressive behaviors was associated with being viewed as a leader as early as third grade among minority youth" (270). The authors urge practitioners that "when designing beneficial early interventions, it is important not only to help children to decrease levels of aggression, but also to focus on utilizing these highly influential youth as more positive role models and to funnel these children's potential leadership capabilities in a more prosocial manner" (273). This study has interesting implications regarding the perception of a "leadership gap" in urban, high-risk environments. Multiple studies show that such environments are conducive to aggressive behavior; this study correlates aggressive behavior with leadership status. This suggests that there is not a deficit of leadership in urban high-risk neighborhoods, but rather that leadership norms are not conducive to public safety or improved police-citizen relations. This can be interpreted optimistically: high-risk urban environments contain ample amounts of active leadership that could potentially be harnessed on behalf of safer neighborhoods.

Waltermaurer, Eve, and Timothy A. Akers. Epidemiological Criminology: Theory to Practice. Vol. 11. Routledge, 2014. This anthology outlines and investigates attempts to actualize the paradigm of epidemiological criminology in a variety of setting and on a variety of scales. For example, Akers discusses the cure violence model in which community outreach workers are trained to deescalate potentially violent situations – this intervention is less concerned with lawbreaking and more so on health outcomes yet it is shown to decrease crime. Bachman covers how the victimization of children can be likened to disease outbreak and argues for public-health-informed steps to be taken when child abuse is uncovered. Ransford, Kane, and Slutkin examine how the neighborhood acts as a primary determinant of health and crime simultaneously – community building around health issues may reduce crime.

Webster, Daniel W., Jennifer Mendel Whitehill, Jon S. Vernick, and Elizabeth M. Parker. "Evaluation of Baltimore's Safe Streets program: effects on attitudes, participants' experiences, and gun violence." Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Center for the Prevention of Youth Violence, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public

Health (2012). *SafeStreets* outreach workers were able to successfully change attitudes concerning gun violence i.e. "the code of the street" – this is an indication of their leadership efficacy. After exposure to the program, "youth in each of the neighborhoods studied tended to think that their friends were much more accepting of using guns to settle grievances than they themselves were" (31). This suggests that the interrupters had interpersonal influence but that they were unable to change perceptions at the community level. However, over all "the program was associated with less acceptance for using guns to settle grievances in the one intervention neighborhood where attitudes were studied in two waves of community surveys" (40). This tentatively suggests that the leadership engendered through *SafeStreets* has community wide benefits.

Weisburd, David, Michael Davis, and Charlotte Gill. "Increasing Collective Efficacy and Social Capital at Crime Hot Spots: New Crime Control Tools for Police." Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 9, no. 3 (2015): 265. Weisburd at al argue that police can and should contribute to the development of informal social control within crime hotspots. With this in mind, the authors investigate a novel approach, the 'Brooklyn Park: Assets Coming together to Take action (BP-ACT)'. The first of 3 stages involves "officers…identify[ing] both the specific problems at hot spots and the key stakeholders and resources", such as "residents, business owners, and community Groups", "that should be involved in solving them" (269). The officer engage assets using a "procedural justice dialogue script (e.g. Mazerolle et al., 2012) to help build trust and social capital with and among residents" (270). Next, "officers…gather intelligence from the community, work with stakeholders to implement crime prevention strategies, and—key to our approach—use their training in collective efficacy and community building to focus residents on creating collective ownership over the hot spot" (270). Finally, "patrol officers…submit information on their activities to BPPD's project coordinator. Officers and the project coordinator will collaborate to assess and track the implementation and progress of agreed-upon community actions in a shared project database" (270).

*Wender, Jonathan and Brian Lande. "Tact, Tactics, and Trust: Building the Foundations for Engagement-Based Policing." In *Engagement-Based Policing: the What, How, and Why of Community Engagement*, 15-29. Major Cities Chiefs Association, 2015.

Weng, Suzie, and S. Lee. "Why Do Immigrants and Refugees Give Back to Their Communities and What Can We Learn from Their Civic Engagement?" VOLUNTAS: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 27, no. 2 (2016): 509-24. Immigrants and refugees are civically engaged because they desire to maintain their ethnic identity and connection with their language-ethnicity community. A desire to pass down cultural knowledge also involves immigrants and refugees in civic associations. Furthermore, immigrants and refugees see their ethnic community as an

extension of family. Thus their civic participation can be thought of as a function of perceived kinship. Civic participation, according to the authors, is a natural expression of obligation, responsibility, and patriotism. Finally, the authors found that civic participation was a "measure of achieved success" (13). Being able to give back to others was a symbol to both respondents and their social networks of their financial and social achievement in a new country. The authors conclude that "a shift in perspective [is needed] from viewing immigrants primarily as people in need of communities' resources…to a view of the resources they are uniquely positioned to provide through facilitating more formal and user-friendly civic engagement" (13).

*Wilson, Camille, and Lauri Johnson. "Black educational activism for community empowerment: International leadership perspectives." International Journal of Multicultural Education 17, no. 1 (2015): 102-120.

Wilson, William J. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Wilson observes that the expansion of inner-city poverty that began in the 1960's coincided with a general rise in the living standards of whites, suggesting that racism continued to harm blacks post the civil rights era. Some explain this as resulting from a "culture of poverty". *The Truly Disadvantaged* responds to this argument by emphasizing the steep reduction of stable employment in distressed communities caused by a globalizing economy and how this economic restructuring impacted poor black families and neighborhoods. As joblessness became ever more the norm of the inner-city, argues Wilson, so did single parent households; the economic incentive to marry evaporated along with the manufacturing jobs. Households headed by a single mother were further economically disadvantaged, compounding the effect of job losses. Some welfare dependence did ensue because the primary victims of this poverty cycle were children. When the children of these households entered adulthood they found few jobs options and so were incentivized to enter the informal economy of the drug market. Meanwhile, gains made by the civil rights movement differentially benefitted middle-class blacks, allowing them to utilize their relative economic advantage to effect a mass-exodus from distressed areas. *This drained leadership, role-models, and capital out of inner-city neighborhoods, leading to civil paralysis*.

*Worthy, Sheri Lokken, Crystal Tyler-Mackey, Patricia Hyjer Dyk, Pamela A. Monroe, and Rachel Welborn. "Turning the Tide on Poverty: Perceptions of Leaders and Leadership in Economically Distressed Communities." Community Development 47, no. 3 (2016): 322-40.

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